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ABSTRACT
The theme of this thesis is Hannah Arendt’s critique and ultimate rejection of the
ideas of individualism developed during the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods.
She rejects the Enlightenment notion of the “abstract man,” but equally rejects the notion
of Romantic introspection that followed. Such a critique is important to Arendt because
she makes human plurality the center for her entire system of thought. Using the French
Revolution, Jewish history, and totalitarianism as her examples, Arendt explains the
effects of such overtly individualistic thinking in both society and politics. The goal of
this thesis is not a comprehensive look at the vast number of theories developed during
the Enlightenment and Romantic periods. That is far beyond its intended scope. The
goal, instead, is to show how Arendt used her critique of a select number of ideas to
further define and clarify her own thoughts. In the end it will be shown that while Arendt
ranged all over in her thinking (from history to politics to philosophy) she engaged these
topics in a systematic way as to explore the affinities and contradictions to human
plurality in whatever she studied. She is drawn to the late 18th/early 19th centuries
precisely because she envisions it as a watershed moment in Western conceptions of
individuality, one that stamped out all thought of human plurality. Arendt wants to
rescue the notion of human plurality and elevate it to a primal position in Western
thought.
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INTRODUCTION:
INDIVIDUALISM, ENLIGHTENEMENT, AND ROMANTICISM
The subject of this thesis is Hannah Arendt’s critique and ultimate rejection of the
ideas of individualism developed during the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods.
She rejects the rational individualism of the Enlightenment and its notion of an abstract
human being, who for Arendt “seems to exist nowhere,” except in thought; but she
equally rejects the notion of an introspective self in romanticism, where reality is given
meaning only through self-consciousness. For Arendt, these two concepts represent two
sides of the same coin. By over-emphasizing the individual, rational on the one hand and
subjective on the other, these ideas helped create an intellectual atmosphere that was, in
Arendt’s eyes, detrimental to the very foundation of politics. With the rise of the
totalitarian powers, Arendt saw that politics had indeed been shaken to its core. She
turned to the eighteenth/earlier nineteenth centuries precisely to understand the problems
of her own time. Arendt, however, was not the only one looking back in history to
understand the death and destruction that seemed to characterize the twentieth century.
There was an overwhelming drive among academics to find the origins of modern
thought, modern society, and modern politics. The response among scholars was
anything but unanimous. Some blamed the Enlightenment for using reason to justify
total domination while others condemned Romanticism for its seemingly irrational
elevation of the self. Along similar lines, some scholars criticized the liberal tradition of
the “left” while others rebuked the conservative “right.” Representative of her eclectic
style of thinking, Arendt drew from each of these criticisms, but did not feel the need to
accept their arguments wholesale. Instead, she developed her own way of addressing the
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problems of the twentieth century. It is Arendt’s unique response to the troubles of her
time that forms the content of this thesis.
At the center of modern political thought is the debate over the rights of
individuals versus the authority of the state. Going all the way back to the Reformation,
questions of individual freedom and political authority appear in virtually every major
discussion on the nature of politics, society, and even man himself. Can the individual
and the state coexist or are they naturally conflicted against one another? The answer to
this questions depended on where and when in Europe it was being asked. According to
Leonard Krieger, the concept of individual freedom, or “individual secular liberty,”
characterized political thought in Western Europe as early as the seventeenth century.
The freedom of the individual depended on maintaining some kind of distance from
political authority. In Germany, however, “individualized freedom,” or Freiheit, had to
contend with another notion of freedom already present: Libertaet, which referred to the
rights of German princes within the Holy Roman Empire.1 After 1650, as German
princes began to exercise more political control, they interpreted Libertaet as the freedom
to rule without Imperial interference. The idea of Libertaet, along with centralized
administration and growing bureaucracies, changed the German principalities into
sovereign territorial states.2 Yet, within these states the individual, and individual rights,
still occupied an ambiguous role. Krieger argues
The German princes never ceased to feel themselves aristocrats as well as
monarchs, not only personally because of their family origins and
connections, not only socially because of their special dependence on the
nobility worked by the peculiarities of the German economic and social
structure, but even institutionally, because the social and constitutional
1

Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1972), 5-6.
2
Ibid., 19-20
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structures were so integrally intertwined that the very development of the
German princes toward absolute sovereignty in their own territory was at
the same time a development of their aristocratic rights within the [Holy
Roman] German Empire. It was this institutional connection between
sovereign power and aristocratic liberties…that made this kind of
Libertaet the representative expression of German political liberty in the
old regime.3
From 1650-1750, as the more individualistic ideas of Freiheit spread into Germany from
enlightened thinkers in Western Europe, they were transformed to fit the prevalent ideas
of Libertaet, resulting in the notion of enlightened absolutism. German thinkers “adopted
western assumptions which made individuals the primary units of society and individual
rights the basis and the limitation of the state, but they interpreted these assumptions in a
way compatible with the preservation of the peculiar German corporate rights and made
the prince arbiter over all.”4 Using natural law, German thinkers were able to combine
inalienable rights and political obligation in the form of an absolutist state.5 After 1750,
political ideas in Western Europe continued to further reflect notions of “material
individualism,” but in Germany “natural law absolutism” held sway in both theory and
practice until the French Revolution.6
During the second half of the eighteenth century, as Berlin became a center for
the Aufklärung, Frederick the Great helped make Prussia a shining example of
enlightened absolutism. He firmly believed “the sovereign represents the state…he and
his peoples form but one body.” He wanted a rational state based on enlightened
principles, not traditional authority. As Krieger points out, however, Frederick’s rational
absolutism reinforced the combination of aristocratic privilege and state authority already
3

Ibid., 13-14
Ibid., 51
5
Krieger uses Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius, and Christian Wolff as his examples, all of whom
ultimately justified absolutism on natural law principles. See Ibid. Pp. 50-71
6
Ibid., 71
4
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present in the idea of Libertaet. Frederick believed in the popular origins of the state,
granting its members natural rights, but he also argued that “particular rights and duties”
were by their nature unequal because they were grounded in the social order, the “estate.”
The sovereign, as an absolute ruler, had authority over both.7
In Berlin and other enlightened cities the question of enlightenment, so closely
connected to the question of individual rights and political authority, was anything but
resolved. Even so-called “enlightened” men had a hard time agreeing on a single
definition. The question itself, “What is Enlightenment,” drew the attention of such
thinkers as Immanuel Kant and Moses Mendelssohn, both of whom offered different
solutions. Kant and Mendelssohn centered their argument on some of the early questions
of enlightenment in Germany: To what extent is an enlightened citizenry possible, or
even desirable? And, if it is indeed possible, what kind of censorship should remain on
the people? According to James Schmidt, questions about free speech and censorship
characterized the first phase of the enlightenment debate in Germany. The other two
phases dealt with religion and the French Revolution respectively.8
For Immanuel Kant, enlightenment meant personal responsibility to reason. To
be enlightened was to break free from one’s own “self-incurred immaturity,” and to “use
one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.”9 Enlightenment was a
difficult path, and the world was fraught with immaturity. Thus, leading up to his time,
Kant saw only a select few, namely the philosophers, as truly freeing themselves. He
knew that he did not live in an “enlightened age,” but he did believe that it was an “age of
7

Ibid., 21-26, 34
James Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences” in What is
Enlightenment: Eighteenth Century Answers and Twentieth Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Los
Angeles, University of California Press, 1996), 2.
9
Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment” in What is Enlightenment?, 58
8
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enlightenment.”10 Kant argued that enlightenment for the greater public was indeed
possible. Not only was it possible, but “nearly inevitable” if only individuals were given
the freedom to use their reason publicly. To use one’s reason publicly is to speak freely,
to engage in open debate as scholars, beyond the borders of any single institution aside
from the public itself. Within social and political institutions individuals may make use
of their reason privately, that is to say they may use reason, but only to the extent that it
does not conflict with the institutions themselves. For within the institution man is bound
by duty and obligation to conform his reason and action. A clergyman must teach the
dogma of his church, just as a tax-collector must collect as the law requires. They may
oppose their duties publicly, in speech and print, appealing to the public or the institution
itself for change, but privately, as their position within the institution requires, they
cannot stray from their obligation.11 If the people are allowed to speak freely and
criticize their institutions in the public realm, then they will inevitably enlighten
themselves as well as their institutions. At the center of Kant’s notion of enlightenment
is the power of the individual to discover his or her own reason and to use it publicly.
“Have the courage to use your own understanding! is the motto of enlightenment.”12
On the other hand Moses Mendelssohn sees enlightenment in a dual fashion; there
is the enlightenment of man as a man (human enlightenment), and of man as a citizen
(civil enlightenment). He writes, “The enlightenment of man can come into conflict with
the enlightenment of the citizen. Certain truths that are useful to men, as men, can at
times be harmful to them as citizens.”13 Sometimes enlightenment cannot disseminate

10

Ibid., 59, 62
Ibid., 59
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through all levels of society without damaging the state itself in the process. At this point
the philosopher must not interfere; the state must take precedence to preserve order.
Thus, there are times when the state must for the sake of man as a citizen withhold his
enlightenment as a man. Mendelssohn’s argument is similar to Kant’s notion of the
private and public uses of reason, but whereas Kant sees possible coexistence
Mendelssohn sees potential conflict.
Scholars and politicians more in line with Mendelssohn spoke of a “relative”
enlightenment, differentiated according to “time, place, rank, and sex.” It then fell to the
censor to determine the level of freedom and “expressive capabilities” appropriate to each
class.14 During his reign, Frederick the Great did in fact ease many of the censorship
laws, causing Kant to praise him as the only monarch who says “Argue, as much as you
about whatever you want, but obey!”15 But other free speech advocates like Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing criticized Frederick for withholding free speech on many political
issues. Lessing argued that Frederick’s policies only allowed for “idiotic remarks”
without substance.16
The debate over enlightenment shifted into its second phase when Frederick the
Great died in 1786. His nephew, Frederick William II, who followed traditional
Christian ideals, relied heavily on the recommendations of more conservative advisors
like Johann Christoph Woellner. In 1788 Woellner and the new king issued the Religion
and Censorship Edicts, restricting many of religious freedoms Frederick the Great
allowed during his reign. This brought a new question to the forefront of enlightened
thinking: To what extent does enlightenment coincide with religion, and where do the
14

Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences,” 10.
Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” 59.
16
Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences,” 3-4.
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two diverge? To the men of enlightenment, superstition had no place in religion. With
works like Apology for the Rational Worshippers of God and Kant’s Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone, enlightenment thinkers tried to promote a rational approach to
religion, which in turn drew fire from conservative critics. Frederick William himself
threatened Kant for misusing his philosophy to “distort and disparage many of the
cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity.”17 James
Sheehan argues, however, that along with rationalism, religious pietism played a major
role in defining the Aufklärung. Thus, enlightened thinkers were not irreligious, but
instead religious reformers, who sought to transform popular opinions on the subject in
Germany, which is precisely why their critics so vehemently attacked them.18
It is important to remember that the Aufklärung was a socio-political movement as
well as an intellectual movement. The ideas developed during the Aufklärung, as well as
the Enlightenment as a whole, helped foster reading clubs and other such societies, which
in turn affected real social and political change. Therefore, a reaction against intellectual
concepts of enlightenment could very well be just as much a reaction against its sociopolitical consequences. In the conservative response to the religious debate, we see one
of the first reactions against enlightenment, a reaction that characterized it as irreligious
and destructive of traditional morality. This reaction was much more a social reaction
than a philosophical one. Politically, both conservatives and enlightened thinkers still
supported an absolutist state, but whereas enlightened thinkers supported it on rational

17

Ibid. 10
James Sheehan, German History, 1770-1886 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), 174-179; The
questions of religious reform and universal enlightenment played into each other as well. Many
enlightened thinkers intended their religious argument for only those who could actually read it. Thus, they
often found middle ground with Woellner on preserving religious tradition among the lower classes. (See
Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences,” 10-11)
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principles, conservatives held on to the idea of traditional privilege. Thus, critics of
philosophical enlightenment were not necessarily the same as critics of the Aufklärung as
a social and political movement. Likewise, critics of the Enlightenment in France were
not necessarily critics of philosophical enlightenment.
There was, however, a philosophical reaction to enlightened thinking beginning to
emerge in the 1770’s. Several thinkers like J.G. Herder
Abhorred enlightened despotism as a dictatorship of reason but resigned
themselves to political absolutism by locating their opposing ideal in a
historically sanctioned, vitalistic, organic freedom in the non-political
realm of aesthetics, religious pietism, or national folk-culture.19
Also in the 1770’s, writers like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe helped spawn a new
literary movement, Sturm und Drang, which emphasized feeling over reason, glorified
Germany’s medieval past, and aggressively rejected foreign influences.20 Henri
Brunschwig argues, however, that the Sturm und Drang must be thought of as a precursor to the Romantic movement, rather than part of it. It would take several decades
for most Sturm und Drang writers to make headway in areas where “reason continued to
reign unchallenged,” such as in Berlin. Also, the Sturm and Drang writers remained
close to their enlightened influences; Herder became highly devoted to Kant and Goethe
admitted his debt to Lessing.21 Herder, Goethe and others mark the beginning of a
second reaction to enlightenment, one that moved away from rationalism towards
aestheticism. Later romantic thinkers picked up on this reaction and placed it at the
center of their critique of enlightened ideas. Again, the idea of romanticism as an
intellectual movement differs from the socio-political movement of Romanticism. Some
19

Krieger, 72; Sheehan, 184
Henri Brunschwig. Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth Century Prussia (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1974), 92
21
Ibid., 94
20
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scholars argue that romanticism is conceivable only in socio-political terms,22 but the
overwhelming emphasis on aesthetics and the self found in almost all romantic thinkers is
hard to deny.
As revolution broke out in France the enlightenment debate entered its third and
final phase. Thinkers were prompted to ask: Does enlightenment foster revolution, and
is an enlightened revolution possible? The Revolution was proof for conservatives that
enlightenment only led to chaos and complete disregard for traditional social order. Now
more than ever the enlightenment debate took on a political tone. Several thinkers, like
Kant, rejected any kind of “right to revolution,” while others thought revolution was
acceptable as long as it occurred in framework of “moral enlightenment.”23 Another of
Kant’s disciples asked if living in a century of enlightenment was indeed “an honor or a
disgrace.”24 Reactions to the Revolution depended on the thinker, but early on it was met
with some level of hope in Germany for the spread of enlightened ideas. As the years
passed, however, and the Revolution became more and more radical, this enthusiasm
soon turned to disillusionment and skepticism. The execution of Louis XVI, the
September Massacres, and the Reign of Terror all alienated enlightened onlookers, and
when Napoleon turned his eye towards Germany, conservative critics suddenly changed
from alarmists to prophets. Once Germany was under French control the concept of
enlightenment underwent profound changes. Some thinkers accepted French ideas of
enlightenment, but opposed certain political measures brought on by French control.
James Schmidt writes, “Because we tend to assume a natural affinity between the

22

Sheehan, 326
Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences,” 11-15.
24
Ibid., 11
23
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Enlightenment and liberal politics, we forget that many Aufklärers were not liberals.”25
On the other hand, many thinkers in Germany promoted liberal politics but did not agree
with enlightened ideas. Echoing later criticisms, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi found it
absurd that anyone could support the “growing power of unrestrained autocracy” in
enlightened absolutism, and at the same time argue about the dangers of religious
superstition.26 Thus, political reform during the period of French control was a unique
mixture of both liberalism and absolutism, but ultimately, with the end of the Holy
Roman Empire in 1806, the idea of Libertaet gave way to a new focus on individualized
freedom, Freiheit.27 The two men most responsible for reform during this period were
Baron Karl vom Stein and Karl August von Hardenberg. Krieger argues these two men
used the idea of revolution from above to retain the supremacy of the state and traditional
social order while still bringing in new individualistic ideas.28
Western individualism in Germany had to contend not only with old absolutist
ideas, but also with the growing aesthetic movement. By the end of the eighteenth
century, Romanticism offered serious challenges to the Aufklärung. Much like the early
aesthetic movement, the first generation of romantics did not consciously rebel against
the Aufklärung as a whole, but saw themselves as fixing its problems.29 One such man
was the political reformer, Wilhelm von Humboldt. If Stein and Hardenberg tried to
unite individualized freedom with traditional absolutist ideas, Humboldt tried to unite it
with new aesthetic ideas. Leonard Krieger writes, “his fundamental unit was the
25

Ibid.,12
Ibid., 12-13 Jacobi echoes the idea that enlightenment used reason to engender new forms of domination
put forth G.W.F. Hegel in his Phenomenology of the Spirit and by Max Horkhiemer and Theodore Adorno
in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, both of which will be discussed later in this introduction.
27
Krieger, 146; On p. x Krieger calls the 19th century the “era of individualism.”
28
Ibid., 140. For an in depth discussion of Stein and Hardenberg see Ibid. Pp. 147-165
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Frederick Beiser, “Early Romanticism and the Aufklarung” in What is Enlightenment?, 318.
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individual, and his fundamental value the free development of his spiritual forces by the
individual.” (emp. added)30 This led Humboldt to emphasize a kind of “non-political
individualism,” defined by feeling and emotion rather than rational thought. Such
political aversion was the norm for early romantic circles, like the Berlin salons of
Henriette Herz and Rahel Varnhagen, where Humboldt frequently visited. Although
French occupation ultimately brought a new wave of liberalism and individualism into
Germany, the fact that it was revolutionary in character and pushed by a “crusading
army” left a negative imprint on the minds of many Germans, which remained long after
the French were gone.31
After 1806, the Romantic movement adapted to the growing push for German
liberation, and for the first time romanticism began to take on a political tone as well, one
that was very nationalistic in character. No one was able to elucidate this new German
nationalism better than Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who was as much an enlightened thinker
as he was a romantic.32 Drawing from Kant, Fichte conceived of a nation of moral
individuals, making his earliest political writings “aggressively individualistic.”33 His
highest goal was the moral freedom of the individual, and to achieve this goal Fichte gave
the nation a synthetic role between the individual and the state. Krieger writes,
“individuals and governments are bound to each other and reciprocally limited only
through their mutual participation in the supreme good of the nation.”34 Fichte merged
individual rights into an organic nation that expressed the “rights of all,” which were then

30

Krieger, 168
Ibid., 139
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James Sheehan writes “Despite his occasional flights into mystical fancy and the subjectivity implied by
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Krieger, 179
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Ibid., 188
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protected by the state. In his later writings, law became a necessary condition for
morality.35
Intellectuals like Fichte expressed a feeling common to both liberals and
conservatives brought on by the growing unrest under French control. Krieger writes
“hostility to the French inspired the national deus ex machina which seemed to solve their
problem of combining a measure of popular freedom with the structure of the traditional
state.”36 Liberals, in the hope of achieving a constitutional monarchy after liberation,
adopted ideas of romantic nationalism. Indeed many romantics were more loyal to the
ideas of liberalism than the men of the Aufklärung had ever been.37 Likewise, political
conservatives also adopted romantic ideas on the nation, particularly the idea of a
uniquely German spirit. For them, nationalism became an increasingly irrational
elevation of everything German, and liberation meant a return to pre-Revolutionary
Germany.38 Even liberals began to use the terms “nation” and “fatherland” rather
indiscriminately to rally support for German liberation. So even though liberals and
conservatives disagreed about the ends of national liberation, both felt equally called to
action by the new ideas of nationalism being circulated by romantic intellectuals.
As we have seen, the first reaction to enlightenment was a conservative appeal to
tradition. Conservatives argued that enlightened thinkers destroyed traditional morality
when they tried to rationalize religion. In the wake of the French Revolution
conservatives appealed to traditional authority and traditional German values as the basis

35

Ibid., 191
Ibid., 197
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of a new German nation. After the Revolution the conservative mentality found its
greatest voice in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).39
Burke argued enlightened thinkers denied the “latent wisdom” in tradition because they
tried to cast off all prejudices, not realizing that prejudice itself has value.40 The second
reaction to enlightenment was an appeal to aesthetics that eventually led to the Romantic
movement. Prior to the French Revolution many enlightened ideas were still used to
promote aestheticism, which was not necessarily irrational. By the end of eighteenth
century, however, romantics pushed the image of the rational individual to the
background to replace it with the image of the emotional individual, or the self. Reason
itself fell under attack as being self-destructive for its lack of emotion or concern for the
self. More than any other thinker, G.W.F. Hegel philosophically justified this argument
against the Enlightenment’s concept of reason. Hegel did not want to abandon reason,
but redefine it on his own terms.
According to Hegel, the Enlightenment tried to measure everything using the
standard of utility, and in doing so turned reason into nothing more than an instrumental
tool.41 This leaves no room for the self, or self-consciousness, only individualized
rationality that has no means of transcending itself. He instead conceived of a spirit that
can understand the phenomenal world, while at the same time being able to transcend it.
He demanded some kind of ontological purpose for morality, rather than being simply
based on reason alone.42 In its efforts to emancipate mankind through reason, the
39

Sheehan, 368
Schmidt, “What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences,” 17. In the
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Krieger, 126-127
40

13

Enlightenment ultimately denied mankind any significance or feeling. Thus, the
inevitable consequence is “death,” a cold rational death with “no more significance than
cutting the head off a cabbage.”43 For Hegel, moral freedom comes through the
individual’s connection with a greater universal spirit, whether it is a world spirit that
realizes itself in history, or a national spirit that realizes itself in politics. He argued that
the state is “that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but
on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the
Whole.”44 Spirit, in the form of the nation, emerges out of the dialectical relationship
between the state and the individual. Hegel’s reaction to the French Revolution matched
many of his contemporaries, and what began as enthusiasm ended in disappointment. He
accuses the Revolution of destroying individuality rather than saving it.45 Though Hegel
tried to rescue reason and individuality by redefining them, he ultimately made them
subservient in general to his idea of spirit, and in particular to his idea of nationalism.
Like most other ideas of nationalism during the push for German liberation, Hegel’s ideas
led to an endorsement of traditional political authority, even though he rejected Burke’s
notion of tradition outright.46
Both Fichte and Hegel developed their philosophical critique of enlightenment
based on events caused by the French Revolution, but they were not the only ones to do
so. By 1815, one could not mention the Enlightenment without mentioning its ultimate
outcome. James Schmidt argues,
With the French Revolution, discussion of the question “What is
enlightenment?” came to a close. How one understood the Enlightenment
43
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came to be determined by the stance one took toward the Revolution. For
critics of the Revolution, enlightenment was a process that undermined the
traditional patterns of belief on which political authority rested and thus
reduced politics to a brutal battle between despotism and anarchy. For
those who remained loyal to what they saw as the ideals of the Revolution,
enlightenment embodied the vision of a society governed by law and
reason. As the new century dawned, the lines of engagement were clearly
drawn. For the Right, enlightenment was a synonym for a political naiveté
with murderous consequences. For the Left, it expressed the unfulfilled
dream of a just and rational society. With both sides sure that they knew
the answer, the question “What is enlightenment?” no longer needed to be
asked.47
Towards the end of the nineteenth century Friedrich Nietzsche tried to re-open the
question of enlightenment once again. He wanted to separate the idea of enlightenment
from the Enlightenment itself as well as the French Revolution. According to Nietzsche,
to approach the Enlightenment on its own terms was a no-win situation. In what he
called “the dialectic of the counter-enlightenment,” Nietzsche saw that all attempts to
resist the Enlightenment paradoxically turned out only to serve its causes. Also, the
Enlightenment did not bring about the liberation of mankind, as was hoped, but instead
quite the opposite, as Europe descended into even greater forms of darkness and
domination. Thus, to save enlightenment from the Enlightenment one had to completely
change the discourse.48
The death and destruction during the first half of the twentieth century laid bare
the brutality of mankind. Answering Nietzsche’s call, many scholars returned to question
of enlightenment to see if the potential for disaster had indeed always been there. In their
Dialectic of Enlightenment Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, following both Hegel
and Nietzsche, argued that enlightenment, which tried to set the world free of mythology
and superstition, only plunged the world in new forms of domination, which were
47
48
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actually worse than their predecessors because they had the illusion of reason. Whereas
Hegel only knew of the Reign of Terror as the worst outcome of the self-destructive
tendencies of enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno saw its culmination in the death
camps of the Third Reich.49 The two men argue that the concept of enlightenment creates
a debate only with itself. In other words, “Enlightenment is totalitarian.”50
Enlightenment defines mythology and superstition on its own terms, and then
triumphantly debunks them using those very same terms.51 Thus, enlightenment’s
struggle with mythology is really a struggle with itself. Hegel made the same argument
for enlightenment and faith.52 For Horkheimer and Adorno the notions of progress,
positivism, and even mass society itself that followed all served to reify the inherent selfdestructiveness of enlightenment.
Armed with her own insights and ideas Hannah Arendt stepped into this
centuries-old debate. While no doubt indebted to many of the ideas preceding her,
Arendt developed a system of thought all her own. Her artful yet at times aggressive
style of writing won her fame as both a scholar and troublemaker. Although she has
much to say on the individual and state authority, she does little to address the question of
enlightenment directly. Thus, there are very few statements throughout her work where
she explicitly states, “enlightenment is…” Likewise, a clear reaction to romantic
thinking emerges in her overall system of thought, but rarely does she come out and say
“romanticism is…” Instead, Arendt’s conceptions of enlightenment and romanticism
have to be drawn out from her historical, political, and philosophical analyses. At the
49
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center of Arendt’s thought is the concept of human plurality: the idea that “men, not Man,
live on the earth and inhabit the world.”53 She proposes human plurality as a median
between the individual and mankind as a whole. The key here is that Arendt did not try
to reconcile the individual with any greater whole, be it state, nation, or mankind itself.
She remained convinced that the individual has no place within the whole as an
individual. Nor can the whole be made to fit concepts created solely for the individual.
Human plurality as well is not an extended concept of the individual, or the whole, but
instead, a concept in itself. And for Arendt not only is it a concept but a basic condition
of our existence.
For Arendt, human plurality is essential to political action. To taint it with
notions of individuality or universalism is to take away from its political character.
According to Arendt, human plurality is given form when we insert ourselves into the
public realm with “words and deeds.” By maintaining a public realm in which politics
can take place, speech and action become our most political attributes as human beings.
This is something that cannot be done by the individual alone, but instead must be done
together with others. Arendt comes into conflict with both enlightened and romantic
thinkers because they try to maintain the supremacy of the individual, while at the same
time subjugating him to a universal whole. Any thoughts of human plurality are snubbed
out or redefined to fit an overtly individualistic system. Much like Horkheimer and
Adorno, Arendt holds this kind of thinking responsible for the horrors of the twentieth
century. Throughout her body of works she attempts to explain how these overindividualized concepts played themselves over the next two centuries, using the French
Revolution, Jewish history, and totalitarianism as her examples. Like most other scholars
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of her time, Arendt wanted to find answers to help her come to terms with the utter
disregard for human life that seemed to plague her century.
In the first chapter I discuss Arendt’s initial response to the individualistic ideas
she found in the late eighteenth-century salon society of Berlin. Simultaneously
addressing her own Jewishness, Arendt chose to recount the life of a Jewish salonniere in
her biography: Rahel Varnhagen.54 Arendt paints a picture that is at times anything but
flattering. She characterizes Rahel and the whole salon society as being ignorant of
politics and naïve of reality. In several places Arendt turns the book into a polemic
against romantic introspection. Finally, she uses Rahel to point out the problems of
Jewish assimilation into Western European culture.
In the second chapter I discuss how Arendt used the ideas she developed in Rahel
Varnhagen to further articulate her own ideas on society and politics. Using Jewish
history and Zionism as her foundation, she explains how the unique case of the Jews in
Western Europe illustrates the problems in modern conceptions of the individual and the
state. She argues that Zionism itself was not immune to these conceptions, and lets her
opinion be known on what she believes was right and what was wrong in the modern
Zionist movement. In The Jew as Pariah55 she uses the idea of the conscious pariah as an
exemplary response to the conditions of the modern world, and in The Origins of
Totalitarianism56 she explains how totalitarianism epitomizes those conditions.
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In the third chapter I discuss Arendt’s effort to fully conceptualize both the
condition and consequences of human plurality. In The Human Condition57 she
differentiates between the three modes of human behavior: labor, work, and action.
While labor and work form part of our basic existence, only action itself arises out the
condition of human plurality. In Between Past and Future58 she explains the antipolitical tendencies inherent in the tradition of political thought, and she further
elucidates her definition of freedom. Finally, in On Revolution59 she addresses the
question of the French Revolution. Although Arendt supports the idea of revolution as
such, she regards the French Revolution as a failure because it ignored human plurality,
which left it devoid of genuine political action.
In the fourth and final chapter I discuss the controversy surrounding Arendt’s
Eichmann in Jerusalem60 and how she sought to validate her argument by clarifying her
own philosophy in The Life of the Mind.61 She argued that Eichmann was not evil, but
lost his ability “to think and to judge,” for himself. In order to prove such a claim Arendt
set out to philosophically define thinking, willing and judging in her own terms. In doing
so she came face-to-face with Immanuel Kant, whose three Critiques mirrored those
same topics. Through her dialogue with Kant, Arendt came to justify not only her
conclusions about Eichmann, but also her entire system of thought and her unforgiving
stance that human plurality was indeed the basic foundation of politics.
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CHAPTER 1
RAHEL VARNHAGEN AND THE BERLIN SALON
From Confession to Introspection
During her university years a renewed interest in the analysis and application of
Christian theology to the problems of the modern world surrounded Hannah Arendt. In
the university, St. Augustine’s Confessions took a primal position as a “pivotal and
crucial text” to guide students in “self-exploration and the descent into the abyss of
consciousness.”1 Arendt herself chose to focus her doctoral dissertation on the different
notions of love in Augustine’s thought, which she found useful in her thinking for many
years to come. Though Arendt’s mature thought is much more complex than her
dissertation, many of the themes that appear in her later work as present in her thoughts
on Augustine.2 Throughout her career, Arendt continually used Augustine’s ideas as a
basis for comparison against modern notions of individuality and expressions of self.
In 1930, Arendt, like many other scholars, wrote a short article to commemorate
the fifteen hundredth anniversary of Augustine’s death. In “Augustine and
Protestantism” Arendt argues Augustine realized in his Confessions that the age of Rome
was coming to an end. But, he saw a new empire emerging in Europe, an empire not of
this world, but of the soul. The spread of Christianity to pagan non-believers created a
growing inner life, an empire in the hearts and minds of believers, all across Europe.3
This was important for Augustine’s idea of the individual man, because he adamantly
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believed man found his path to God in the inner soul, and that path was never the same
for any two men. By recognizing God’s saving grace within himself, each man
recognized the individuality of his inner soul. This was not a recognition of the
individual for its own sake, but instead for the sake of God alone. Upon exploring one’s
own individuality, one would ultimately find God and the redemption of His saving
grace. A confession of the soul, like the one Augustine gave, was a testament to the
grace of God in an individual’s life, but it was also a reminder of the universality of
mankind. Arendt writes, “The individual confession carries a general applicable
meaning: God’s grace can enter any and every individual life in this same way.”4
For Arendt, there is a progression from the ancient Greeks who confessed for the
glory of man, to Augustine who confesses for the glory of God. The Greeks regarded the
unknown parts of the inner life, which they declared to be outside the realm of reason, as
separate from the soul. For Augustine, however, these sinful and sometimes unknown
parts of our inner lives were indeed part of the soul. The Catholic confessional comes
almost directly from Augustinian ideas of confession. The institutionalized confessional,
however, “By its very nature…altered the original meaning of confession” because it
“places the authority of the Church between the soul and God.” This is a corruption of
Augustine, according to Arendt, because “Augustine confesses to God alone, not to other
human beings.”5 Although Augustine’s confession is not for the sake of the individual
himself, it is still a task that the individual alone must realize in communication with his
inner soul. The confessional simply placed a barrier on the individual realization of the
soul. For Arendt it was the Protestant conscience that tore down that barrier. She
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believed that Luther reached back and rescued Augustine by creating the concept of the
believer whose individual conscience stands in direct relationship to God.6 Arendt
argued, however, that just as the Catholic confessional perverted Augustine’s ideas, so
too did many modern interpretations of individuality pervert Luther’s notion of a
Protestant conscience. Beginning with Descartes’ Meditations and finding full
expression during the 18th and 19th centuries, the idea of confession came full circle back
to Greek notions of self, where the individual once again confessed for the sake of
himself alone, leaving God behind. In Arendt’s eyes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau solidified
the destruction of Luther’s Augustinian recovery when he created a Confessions of his
own, which despite taking its namesake from Augustine, completely inverted his ideas.
Rousseau, his contemporaries, and his followers usurped Augustine’s notions of
individuality, and they irrevocably changed the meaning of confession forever. “With
increasing secularization, religious self-reflection [read: confession] before God lost its
meaning. There was no longer an authority to confess to, and religious self-reflection
therefore became simply reflection on one’s own life, devoid of the religious element.”7
Rousseau’s Confessions were for a notion of truth, so that the reader, seeing this
visible monument he constructed for himself, could use it to draw conclusions about
human nature. Liliane Weissberg writes in her introduction to Arendt’s Rahel
Varnhagen, “It is no longer God, but the reader, who is asked for forgiveness and
understanding…Rousseau insists on his individuality while trying to transcend it.”8
Rousseau’s confession is epistemological and anthropological, meant to discover the
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nature of truth and human nature itself. Rousseau argued that truth is transcendent by the
fact that it is universally valid and universally accessible to the reason of every
individual. Here Rousseau turned Augustine on his head in suggesting that the
confession could exist for its own sake and not for the sake of God.
In Germany, the idea of self-expression as confession found its greatest support in
the writing of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Arendt argues that Goethe wrote in a highly
confessional style. He expressed himself through his characters, who gave detailed
confessions in the style of Rousseau. These confessions were often times symbolically
autobiographical, reflecting Goethe’s own personality. Because of this Arendt suggests
that his works were “fragments of a great confession.”9 Goethe, mirroring Rousseau,
attempted to portray his individual characters through “autonomous self-development.”10
Arendt writes: “It is amusing to note how closely the assimilation of the Jews into society
followed the precepts Goethe proposed for education in his Wilhelm Meister.” In the
novel, a young burgher sets out to achieve acceptance into high aristocratic society. To
do so he has to play the role of an aristocrat, mimicking them exactly in thought and
action. “Everything depended on ‘personality,’ and the ability to express it.”11 A
“cultivated personality” is the romantic form of confession. Goethe’s Meister confessed
himself only to be recognized by others. The young burgher had to show his new
personality to others so they could acknowledge and approve it. His individuality meant
nothing outside the already prescribed world of the aristocracy. Confession was then no
longer about individuality, but instead acceptance and assimilation. Meister’s “cultivated
personality” and his individuality were completely hollow.
9
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Arendt’s critique of Rousseau and Goethe found its fullest expression in her
analysis of a late eighteenth, early nineteenth century Jewish salonniere by the name of
Rahel Varnhagen. Not only was Rahel an outspoken advocate of both Rousseau and
Goethe, but she was also the embodiment of many of their ideas. She felt compelled to
confess in own her way through countless letters of self expression to friends and family.
Arendt’s biography, Rahel Varnhagen, is an attempt to understand Rahel through her
letters, but it is also a critique of the conceptions of individuality she found in Rahel and
her fellow salonnieres, which stood in sharp contrast to the ideas Arendt familiarized
herself with in her study of Augustine and his Confessions.
Jewish migration into Prussia from Austria began a century earlier when the Jews
were kicked out of Vienna for little reason more than being Jewish. Berlin opened its
doors in 1670 to the more prosperous Jews who brought in opportunities for trade. This
led to the development of a small but wealthy Jewish community in Berlin and upper
class Jews soon began to distance themselves from other less affluent Jews living
throughout the Prussian countryside.12 Making up only about two percent of the greater
Jewish population, the Berlin Jews became an increasingly integrated part of Prussian
high society. By the time of the Aufklärung, wealthy Jews in Berlin achieved levels of
acceptance and social equality that were rarely seen elsewhere in Germany. Yet despite
being accepted into Prussian society, they could never escape their status as Jews. Being
Jewish was still seen as something negative one had to overcome. Jews in general had no
political rights and the rights given to wealthier Jews were given not because of any
political acceptance but instead because of a newfound social acceptance. Arendt writes,
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“A political struggle for equal rights might have taken the place of the personal struggle.
But that was wholly unknown to this generation of Jews.”13 The more assimilated Jews
became the more they wanted to leave any traces of their Jewish names and heritage
behind. Rahel Varnhagen was no exception. Even from an early age she wanted to
escape her identity as a Jew, her ‘infamous birth.’14
Rahel Varnhagen—born as Rahel Levin in 1771—was certainly a product of her
time. Educated in German romantic literature and enlightenment philosophy, she
assimilated quickly into Berlin high society. In addition to being well-known within the
Jewish community, Rahel also socialized with many upper class Christians, such as
Prussian nobles and intellectuals. Rahel and her Jewish friends took hold of the salon
culture in late eighteenth century and virtually ran Berlin social life until 1806. Being
born under the rule of Frederick the Great, Rahel was lucky enough to come of age
during a high period of German culture. She clung to the words of romantics like
Goethe, and found solace in the thinking of enlightened idealists like Johann Gottlieb
Fichte. Rahel displayed a unique combination of enlightened rationalism and romantic
introspection precisely because German thought combined these two modes of thought
more anywhere else in Europe.
Thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing helped promote
rationalism with ideas like Selbstdenken, or “self-thinking.” Lessing conceived of selfthinking in terms of individualized rationality, “to think for one’s self,” which influenced
Kant’s notions of enlightenment that came shortly after. Reality was filled with rational
truths, universally valid and equally attainable by all men. Rational self-thinking was not
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an escape from the experience of reality, merely an analysis of it. Lessing believed that
in addition to rational truths there were also historical truths, equally accessible through
rational thought. He argued “the mature individual recognizes ‘historical truths’ by
virtue of his reason,” reason meaning a capacity for rational thought.15 Rahel herself
once wrote, “Everything depends on self-thinking.”16 Rahel’s notion of self-thinking,
however, did not come directly through Lessing.17 It came instead through his friend and
contemporary, Moses Mendelssohn, a prominent Jewish philosopher living in Berlin a
generation before Rahel. Mendelssohn shared many ideas with Lessing but differed
from him in a few key areas. He did not accept Lessing’s idea that the individual could
rationally derive truth out of history. History was for Mendelssohn an accidental
outcome occurring randomly from an infinite number of possibilities; there was no way
to rationally approach it. Reason did not manifest itself in history. “‘Historical and
rational’ truths are separated so finally and completely that the truth-seeking individual
himself withdraws from history.”18 Thus, self-thinking becomes a completely inwardlooking function. Mendelssohn’s self-thinking “brings liberation from objects and their
reality, creates a sphere of pure ideas and a world which is accessible to any rational
being without benefit of knowledge or experience.” Arendt argues this was “a thought
that would hardly have occurred to the men of the Enlightenment,” including Lessing.19
Mendelssohn brought a notion of romanticism to self-thinking, making it exist purely for
an individualistic notion of truth, as Rousseau had done. In doing so pure self-thinking
then became introspection. Introspection, according to Arendt accomplishes two things:
15
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it dissolves all existing situations into moods and it gives an aura of objectivity to
everything subjective.20
In Rahel Varnhagen Arendt argues that Rousseau exemplified this modern
“mania for introspection,” so much so that he even eliminated the need for memory that
had been so crucial to Augustine’s notion of confession.21 Arendt writes:
If thinking rebounds back upon itself and finds its solitary object within
the soul—if, that is, it becomes introspection—it distinctly produces (so
long as it remains rational) a semblance of unlimited power by the very act
of isolation from the world; by ceasing to be interested in the world it also
sets up a bastion in the front of the one “interesting” object: the inner self.
In the isolation achieved by introspection thinking becomes limitless
because it is no longer molested by anything exterior…Reality can offer
nothing new; introspection has already anticipated everything.22
For Arendt, arguing as Augustine would, it is through memory that we discover the
reality of the outside world. That the outside world has some degree of reality to it is
something introspective thinkers find “highly disturbing.” Arendt accuses Rousseau, and
Rahel, of what she calls “sentimental remembering,” where the present is drawn up from
memory into the subjective self where only introspective feelings remain; everything is
eternally present and memory becomes nothing more than potentiality. The distinction
between past and present no longer exists. Arendt adds Rahel’s own words of “Facts
mean nothing to me at all” to further drive home her point.23 Arendt continues to
illustrate Rahel’s addiction to introspection by saying:
The more imaginary a life is, the more imaginary its sufferings, the greater
is the craving for an audience, for confirmation. Precisely because
Rahel’s despair was visible, but its cause unknown and incomprehensible
to herself, it would become pure hypochondria unless it were talked about,
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exposed…She needed the experience of others to supplement her
own…The more people understood her the more real she would become.24
Because Rahel’s existence was based solely on an attempt to gain the recognition of
others, Arendt accuses her of being indiscreet and shameless. Arendt applies these
qualities not just to Rahel, but to the modern notion of confession in general. Arendt
again returns to Rousseau, whose Confessions were the “first great model of
indiscretion.” In Rousseau’s Confessions the self is completely exposed to the
anonymous future reader. But according to Arendt, posterity loses the ability to judge
and forgive because it simply becomes the fantasized means for reflecting and perceiving
the inner self.
The solitude of the would-be confessor becomes boundless. The
singularity of the person, the uniqueness of the individual character, stood
out against the background of indefinite anonymity. Everything was
equally important and nothing forbidden. The importance of the emotions
existed independently of the possible consequences, independent of
actions or motives.25
The absence of inhibition is necessary because of the similar necessity Rahel felt to
destroy all avenues of silence, which would allow for the greatest possible outer response
and reinforcement of the internally created reality. This is why Rahel wrote so many
letters exposing herself to her readers, and why she set up her salon to mirror this
practice. For Arendt, because this reality was internally created, then it was indeed a
false reality, obscuring any notion of truth in order to maintain its own existence. It
would seem to be synonymous with the modern ideological mindset.
There is little doubt that Rahel held both Rousseau and Goethe in the highest
esteem. She repeatedly referred to her letter-writing as a form of confession, and even
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signed a letter to a friend “Confessions de J.J. Rahel,” which was a play on the elongated
title of Rousseau’s own work, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The influence
of Rousseau and Goethe took physical manifestation in Rahel’s salon which, in fact,
started out as a reading circle dedicated to Goethe. In the salon, all of Rahel’s notions of
individuality and introspection came to fruition. Rahel and her fellow salonnieres were
able to create a culture of their own within the realm of the salons. Outside the salon
their ideas fell apart when met with the experiences of reality and history, and indeed
Rahel would have to face this first hand when the Napoleonic wars broke down the salon
culture in 1806. But for a time Rahel and her friends exported their ideas to all of Berlin,
molding it in their image. The salons set the pace for cultural life in Berlin during the
late eighteenth century.
The Birth and Death of the Berlin Salon
According to Hannah Arendt, “Berlin social life had a brief genesis and short
duration,” coming to fruition during the French Revolution and being extinguished with
the Napoleonic Wars in 1806. Arendt of course does not mean that Berlin had absolutely
no social life prior to or after this short period, for even Rahel herself was still socially
active beyond 1806. But for Arendt, during this short period of time the salon culture
created in Berlin its own unique mixture of enlightened and romantic ideas that
influenced German thought and social organization for generations to come. Although
affected by the Enlightenment in France, the salon culture was largely a continuation of
the Aufklärung, which was particularly German. Arendt argues the fact that salon culture
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in Berlin developed slightly later than other salon movements in Europe meant it was
mostly isolated in Berlin itself and considerably more private in nature.26
The first Berlin salon, called the League of Virtue (Tugendbund), began in the
1780s. A prominent Jewish woman by the name of Henriette Herz ran the salon in which
the League met. Like many other influential Jewish women in Berlin, Herz was highly
assimilated into German culture and married to a Christian man, Marcus Herz, a wellknown physician and intellectual. Though Marcus Herz often gave lectures to the
League, and both men and women attended, in the salon men played a secondary role.
“In those days the women were actually the agents of social assimilation.”27 Still the
salon was thought to be socially neutral, a place where men and women, scholars and
artists, bourgeois and noble, Christians and Jews all met on equal ground. Arendt is
quick to point out however, “this idea of the equal rights of all good human beings first
gave rise to the kind of indiscretion we have come to regard as typically Romantic.”28
Members of the salon were obligated to show each other all important personal letters as
a means of self-disclosure. Among the members was the daughter of Moses
Mendelssohn, Dorothea. Arendt uses Dorothea as a means to critique her father’s
philosophy. She writes “she [Dorothea] could with some justice and without too great
malice be considered the perfect product of her father’s naively ambiguous orthodoxy.”29
Arendt accuses Dorothea of having no concept of reality outside her self-centered
emotional state of mind. Dorothea fell in love with the well-known intellectual Friedrich
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Schlegel, eventually leaving her husband and children and running to him “like a moth to
a candle.” Arendt writes:
Dorothea did not learn to know the world, but only Schlegel; she did not
belong to Romanticism, but to Schlegel; she was not converted to
Catholicism, but to Schlegel’s religion. She wanted to ‘build a temple’ to
him. Her love was completely unreflecting, only the reflected expression
of her fascination…The world was nothing but the passing foil for her
emotions, for all the churned-up passions within her. When, in her old
age, the passion withered, she became bigoted.30
Just a Moses Mendelssohn refused to acknowledge the reality of history, or at least
acknowledge its role in self-creation, so too was Dorothea stuck in her own self-created
world where nothing had meaning outside what she gave to it. Dorothea had assimilated
to point of self-annihilation; she was nobody except what she thought others wanted her
to be. Her “cultivated personality” was her only reality. Unlike Dorothea who was
overly emotional, Henriette Herz had a cold rationality to her. Herz interpreted the
“virtue” of her salon to mean personal dedication to reason, as defined by Lessing. Rahel
and others felt that she avoided personal experience far too much, and they thought by the
end of her life she would not really have lived at all. Eventually disagreements over the
meaning of concepts like “self-thinking” caused the more romantic-leaning members of
the League, like Rahel, to branch out and form their own salon.
While attending the League of Virtue, Rahel’s reputation as an educated and
intelligent socialite began to grow, and slowly a circle began to develop around her as
well. Herz and Rahel did indeed have much in common, and except for some of the
details in their lives, the two followed very similar paths. Rahel’s own salon formed as
people began to leave the League and was solidified as its successor within a few years.
Rahel and her friends pushed themselves even further into romantic ideas. Her
30
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generation found “its own mode of expression in its reverence to Goethe…He was their
spokesman.”31 Again the salon valued no member as higher in rank than any other. As
Rahel said, ‘each of them acquired neither more nor less value than he himself was able
to establish by virtue of his cultivated personality (emp. added).’32
In Berlin, beginning with the more enlightened salon of Henriette Herz and
finding its full realization in Rahel’s romantic salon, private life slowly lost any level of
intimacy. The indiscretion of the salon meant that “private life itself had acquired a
public, objective quality.”33 Arendt adamantly argues that the private and public realms
are inherently separate from one another. By trying to mix them, or destroy the
distinction between the two, the salons skewed the definitions of objectivity and
subjectivity, and created a false reality for both realms. The upheaval caused by the
Napoleonic Wars in 1806, proved too much for the salons to continue their fantasized
view of the public world. Arendt writes:
The salon in which private things were given objectivity by being
communicated, and in which public matters counted only insofar as they
had private significance—this salon ceased to exist when the public world,
the power of general misfortune, became so overwhelming that it could no
longer be translated into private terms. Once more everything personal
was being decided by things that affected everyone…The possibility of
living without any social status, ‘an imaginary Romantic person’…was
now blocked off. Never again did Rahel succeed in becoming the actual
center of a representative circle revolving solely around her own
personality. Never was she able to forget the period which was now gone
forever.34
After 1806, salon culture once again took on a new shape, this time forming around a
new group of people and taking on a much more exclusive and patriotic nature.
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Conservative, high ranking civil servants, who up to this point could not compete with
the Jewish salonnieres, were the new central figures in Berlin’s social life. The first
group to emerge in Berlin along this vein was called Zelter’s Singing Circle (Zeltersche
Liedertafel), named after its founder. The group was meant to ‘cultivate the art of song
and further the national idea.”35 The Singing Circle was supposed to be a glee club, but it
was really a political club in disguise to hide itself from the censors. Wilhelm von
Humboldt once wrote after attending a meeting: ‘things are too serious there to permit
any singing.’36 From the Singing Circle came the Christian-German Table Society
(Christlich-Deutsche Tischgesellschaft), a private club with an outspoken conservative
nationalist mindset. The Table Society stood in opposition to all of the social changes
seen during the Aufklärung, and likewise rebelled against the inroads to liberalism that
the Napoleonic occupation brought with it. They rebelled “intellectually against the
Enlightenment, politically against France, and socially against the salons.”37 Rahel and
her fellow salonnieres were, for their part, kicked out of high society in Berlin.
Although the Table Society did not share Rahel’s romantic views, it was still
highly romantic in its own ways. The Table Society, and conservative Prussian
nationalism, advocated a kind of anti-Enlightenment romanticism. They scoffed at the
supremacy of reason and instead emphasized a universal spiritual and emotional
connection with the world and among the German people. They politicized romantic
aestheticism by combining it with Prussian nationalism, to promote the idea of a German
spirit. This idea of a universal spirit among all German people provided nationalist
fervor that was much needed in the fight against Napoleon. However, this mindset did
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not die down once Napoleon was gone, and the romantic conservatives maintained their
grip on German politics. Furthermore, the universal German spirit was universal only
insofar as one was a pure-blooded German Christian male. Membership in the ChristianGerman Table Society was forbidden for women, Jews, and Frenchmen—all equated
with the Aufklärung’s corruption of Berlin society.38 Arendt argues that these ‘political
Romanticists’ emerged as a conservative reaction to recreate the exclusivity of the
Prussian noble class in both high society and politics.
Rahel continued to socialize during the years following the downfall of her salon,
though in a slightly more limited fashion. The crises of the day forced her to reconcile
the created reality of the salon with the actual reality of the public world, which now
called for a certain level of recognition and adaptation. Some of the members of Rahel’s
pre-war salon fought and died in the Napoleonic Wars, others continued to play a role in
Berlin social life through more conservative circles like the Table Society, and several
others fell off into obscurity and anonymity. Anonymity was, of course, completely
opposed to the self-revealed individual of Rahel’s salon who craved recognition from
others at all times. It was certainly not a path Rahel saw for herself. Yet, her subjective
ideal was crushed by the weight of history. Rahel had to somehow find her way in a
world that seemed alien to her. In an effort to rescue herself from despair, Rahel turned
to the new nationalistic ideas stirred up by the French control, of which she found the
ideas of Johann Gottlieb Fichte most consoling.
In response to the Napoleonic Wars, Fichte published a series of lectures entitled
Addresses to the German Nation, which were a continuation his philosophy of history
developed a few years earlier in his Fundamental Principles of the Present Age. Using
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these two works as her guide, Rahel found new hope for the possibilities of her role in the
world. Yet the level of abstraction in Fichte’s ideas allowed Rahel to take from them
what she wanted without fully understanding their complexity. Fichte’s philosophy
reinforced Rahel’s deterministic quietism when he wrote in his Fundamental Principles:
“time proceeds along its fixed course, which is determined by Eternity, and no single
force can hasten or force anything within it.”39 This obviously struck a chord with
Rahel’s desire to withdraw from the objective world and create her own reality. Fichte
argued that “the course of history is a priori determined; it remains only for the
philosopher to trace its laws.” Rahel could be content to be uninvolved in the world as
long as she understood its reasons. Arendt calls it Fichte’s “duality of the power and
impotence of man in history.”40 No doubt Rahel felt impotent in the face of the
uncontrollable circumstances surrounding the Napoleonic Wars, which caused her to be
pushed to the periphery of Berlin social life and dashed her hopes for equal acceptance.
With the world coming down around her, she at least needed to understand why.
Fichte’s ideas, however, were not static, and the picture of reality he presents in
his Addresses is not the same as his Fundamental Principles. In fact, some of his
conclusions stand in direct opposition to previous ones. Arendt argues that Fichte
ultimately found his dualism “highly unsatisfactory” because he could not find an answer
to it. But as Arendt points out, for “the unsophisticated hearer,” like Rahel, “he appeared
to resolve it forthrightly enough.”41 In his Fundamental Principles, Fichte argued for the
idea of five world epochs, beginning with the time before history when man was ruled by
instinct and ending in an age where mankind has formed itself into an image of Reason.
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In his Addresses, Fichte dropped the first and last epochs because he no longer liked the
idea of Being as a fixed and unchanging entity. He wrote. “Whoever believes in a fixed,
permanent, and dead Being, believes in it only because he is dead in himself.” For him
freedom meant “not being rational but becoming rational.”42 Readers like Rahel were
lost in the complication of Fichte’s transition. For his new philosophy Fichte chose to
focus on a single epoch from his previous succession: the epoch of rational science,
where truth is recognized and loved supremely by mankind. Thus, Fichte no longer
sought terminal progress in mankind with a clear utopian endpoint, but instead a neverending progression when man takes the given present, understands its reasons, and from
there makes a yet unrealized future. This gave man a new power to create history, rather
than simply standing by and watching idly. Fichte, however, argued that there was
always going to be a given existing world that could only be taken passively. The world
to come, which was still a priori because it was pre-determined by the laws of reason,
could be a world of change. But it will always be a world to come, eternally in the future,
for once it is in the present it loses its ability for change, it simply is. Fichte’s notion of
meaningful action comes with respect for realizing a future existence. The way to bring
about change is to find the truth in the present and understand the laws of reason at work,
so that they can be realized in the future. Fichte here seems to take on a kind of Platonic
idealism towards the notion of progress: that the love of Truth and not its utopian
realization is the only reality. We can never obtain Truth itself, that is pure Reason, or
pure Being, because there will always be a part of us stuck in this world, Fichte’s profane
present. Still, just because we can never become a true reflection of Reason does not
mean that we cannot organize ourselves to produce the greatest love for Reason in our
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societies. Thus, in the Addresses Fichte called for a German nation with a breakdown of
all social barriers, similar to what Rahel advocated in her salon, a place where all classes
came together guided by truth rather than tradition, birth, and history.
Rahel found her sense of nationalism on similar terms. Fichte writes “the
individual person is absorbed by the concept of the whole, is absolutely forgotten in a
unity of thought.”43 This reinforced Rahel’s idea of subjectivity. It was simply her
notion of the salon expanded to fit the German nation, and it gave her a new sense of
conviction. According to Arendt, “to belong to a new community, then, Rahel needed to
annihilate herself and her origin.” She in essence had to not be Jewish anymore,
something she had striven for her entire life. It was a loss of any kind of pre-existing
identity so that Rahel could start anew simply as herself. In a future shaped by pure
thought she did not need to be anything except part of that consciousness, which if her
salon was no longer open to her could take the form of the German nation. The
complexity of Fichte’s thought left it open to much interpretation, and Arendt notes that
“ultimately, she [Rahel] took over from him nothing but an empty pattern which could be
used to comprehend everything and nothing. Her new patriotism, which so often had
embarrassing overtones, was nothing but a premature conclusion which she derived from
Fichte under the oppressive force of circumstance.”44 Ultimately Rahel’s patriotism,
though helpful for a short while, did not help her break through her social isolation. It
eventually faded in her, and she sought new ways to re-enter society.
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Parvenus and Pariahs
The upheaval caused to high society in Berlin by the Napoleonic Wars left Rahel
with no place to truly be herself anymore. She no longer had a place in the new, highly
conservative, salon culture of Berlin. The assimilation once offered by participation in
the salons was now closed to her. Rahel either had to accept her social isolation or find
new forms of assimilation out in the world. Different from the salon, where identity was
created and self-willed, to the point even of destruction of any world outside its own,
assimilation in the world meant that Rahel had to alter her identity to fit an already
prescribed uniformity. That uniformity was the norms and attitudes of the Prussian noble
class. Unlike in the salon, where nobles humbled themselves to participate in isolated
individual self-creation, Prussian noble society had a well-established worldly identity.
To be a part of it meant coming into prescribed norms of behavior, attitude, and selfidentification that not only had consequences for social assimilation, but for political
assimilation as well. Assimilation in the salon could be apolitical because it created its
own world, but assimilation in the outside world had inherently political implications.
The Prussian noble class was a political class, populated by bureaucrats and
administrators, and they tried to define political identity exclusively in their own image.
For a person to be truly political, according to Arendt, meant the ability to represent
oneself through speech and action in the political realm. For Arendt, this is the source of
all power in politics.45 In Prussia, the aristocratic privilege of the noble class had long
been associated with the power of the state. Their social position reinforced their
political power and their political power reinforced their social position. That is precisely
why Rahel and so many others tried to gain political power through social recognition.
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And because nobles defined acceptable society, the path the political power (i.e. political
participation) meant adherence to the norms of noble society. Prussian nobles tried to
limit political participation to those who were most like themselves. Thus, German
Christian males (preferably noble) were the only one could actually participate in
government, that is hold offices and create policy. Foreigners, Jews, and women were
simply not allowed. While woman were given political identity through their husband or
father, Jews had no political identity whatsoever. The only group that actually gained
any level of political participation was the bourgeoisie. Though looked down on socially
by the nobility, the bourgeois fit the basic criteria for political participation. As they
grew in strength and number, and enlightened monarchs like Frederick the Great
appointed political offices based more on merit than title, the bourgeoisie entered the
ranks of the bureaucracy at a rate that alarmed many conservative nobles. Jews, on the
other hand, had no path to political power outside assimilation, and in her desire for
political identity, Rahel decided that assimilation was the only choice.
Rahel felt the exclusivity of the Prussian noble class all her life because of her
Jewishness. The Jews were an apolitical class, and the Prussian nobility sought to keep it
that way as long as possible. Not only were Jews apolitical in the sense that they could
not represent themselves through political speech and/or action, but even basic political
rights given to most other subjects of the state, like equal protection under the law, were
denied to the Jews. Any civil protection, of which there was some of varying degrees,
was given to them as a gift of the state. Heidi Tewarson, another biographer of Rahel,
argues that despite gains in social acceptance, Jews were still forced to conform to
elaborate political regulations that taxed them heavily, restricted their rights to certain
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businesses, and held them collectively responsible for any act committed by a Jewish
person. Even Frederick the Great, “the so-called enlightened king, was particularly adept
at devising new schemes for filling his treasury” with money taken from the Jewish
community.46 Rahel simply could not define herself politically while being Jewish at the
same time. She managed to escape this dilemma within the walls of her salon, where any
previous notions of self (like being a Jew) were destroyed, but after 1806 it faced her
head on once again.
Rahel had always admired the French Enlightenment, as seen in her emulation of
Rousseau, but she did not see Napoleon as the liberator of the Jews. A process of limited
emancipation had been going on in Prussian for decades. The Napoleonic Wars
corrupted that process by pushing wholesale emancipation on the German people by
force. Influential Jews during the Aufklärung worked towards edicts of emancipation and
legal protection for a limited number of Jews at first, namely those assimilated Jews of
Berlin high society. Assimilated Jews based their self-identity on the idea of
exceptionality. They hesitated to bring about full-scale emancipation as much as their
noble counterparts. The idea was a moderate expansion of political rights starting with
the most exceptional Jews and then eventually spreading to the more ordinary ones. Fullscale emancipation would not only liberate the educated Jews, but also the ordinary,
“backward,” Jews, and the distinction on which the social status of the exceptional Jews
stood would suddenly disappear.47 Ordinary Jews could never hope to assimilate as a
class, because to have exceptional Jews the rest of Jewish society had to be just that,
ordinary. As long as exceptional Jews were kept limited they could be accepted into
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Prussian society as Jews, but at the same time not like Jews. In other words, by
controlling assimilation Prussian noble society kept the power to define what it meant to
be Jewish, namely being apolitical.48
When liberal Prussian reformers during the Napoleonic Wars brought the
discussion and eventually passage of wholesale emancipation to the forefront,
conservative Prussian nobles resisted it tooth and nail. The family of Rahel’s former
fiancé, Count Finckenstein, even helped lead a coalition against the reforms of Baron
Karl vom Stein and Karl August von Hardenberg.49 Other more modest plans of
emancipation prior to 1806 were now looked upon as equally dangerous and disruptive.
In January 1808 Stein passed legislation granting full-scale citizenship to all German
subjects in the largest cities regardless of rank or birth. This legislation sought to abolish
many of the restrictions to individual civil liberties placed on the Jews like a ban on
intermarriage (without conversion), restrictions on trade and banking or special taxes just
for Jews, and barring them from military service. By alleviating the Jews of all these
weights it was hoped that more Jewish capital would come into circulation and Jewish
people in general would be more open to adopting German ways of life.50 This was a
success in some ways as many Jews did in fact help support the Wars of Liberation
against Napoleon several years later.51 Orthodox Jews, however, enjoyed their isolated
lifestyle and wanted nothing to do with the German people or the state. Many of the Jews
in the early Aufklärung, like Moses Mendelssohn, were fighting anti-Semitism on one
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front and Orthodox Judaism on the other.52 Mendelssohn was reproached for teaching in
German or even reading it in the place of Hebrew. Yet, Mendelssohn marked the
beginning of new Jewish movement of assimilation and eventual equality in Berlin,
during which Rahel’s salon found great influence and acceptance. It was a slow
movement, however, and reforms during the Napoleonic Wars tried to push it as fast as it
could go. In 1812, under the leadership of Hardenberg, another sweeping edict solidified
mass Jewish emancipation and gave equality to Christians and Jews in virtually all areas.
Arendt, however, was quick to point out the difference between civil rights and
political freedom.53 Arendt calls the edict of 1808 municipal emancipation because it
simply legalized the civic privileges already enjoyed for the most part by wealthy urban
Jews. This municipal emancipation outlived the Napoleonic era, and stayed intact for the
most part after 1812. According to Arendt, the edict of 1812 was much more threatening
to the Prussian nobility and already assimilated Jews because it destroyed the distinction
between ordinary and exceptional Jews. This would mean that ordinary Jews could start
to make inroads in political participation outside of the prescribed norms of Prussian
noble society. It created such a backlash that even assimilated Jews like Rahel were no
longer welcomed, regardless of assimilation and whatever municipal freedoms had been
given to them. To be an emancipated Jew during the Napoleonic Era was suddenly no
more profitable than being a non-emancipated one before it. Many assimilated Jews
preferred conversion to Christianity rather than being labeled as an “emancipated Jew,”
for that was surely the path to complete social exile.54 After the Napoleonic Wars the
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edict of 1812 was practically rescinded to ensure that German Christian males retained
their monopoly on political participation.
The Napoleonic Wars left the Prussian nobility and Berlin high society with a
distaste for Judaism that lasted long after Napoleon was gone. The anti-Semitism that
permeated the salon society during the war carried over into post-Napoleonic Prussia, in
which social exclusion was now added to a reinstatement of political exclusion. If
anything, the Napoleonic Wars strengthened anti-Semitism among the most conservative
circles, where a Jew was always a Jew no matter what they did or how they changed.
Soon, the Napoleonic Wars became synonymous with the end of Aufklärung. Rahel
mourned her loss: “Until now I have lived under the auspices…under the wings, of
Frederick the Second. Every pleasure from outside, every good, every advantage…can
be ascribed to his influence: this has been shattered over my head.”55
Prior to 1808 Jews that wished to keep their religion were allowed to socially
assimilate with an understanding that it was impossible for them to gain political
assimilation as a Jew. If Jews wanted genuine political self-identification that meant they
had to conform to Prussian noble society and all it norms, meaning they had to renounce
their Jewish origins and marry into the nobility. A Jew could be a parvenu (one who
assimilates) and a Jew at the same time only if they accepted the definition of Jew given
to them by Prussian noble society. This path was open to Jews in the generation before
Rahel’s, and several assimilated Jews opted to give up their aspirations of a political
existence in order to keep their heritage and religion. Moses Mendelssohn did just that.
Berlin high society had to accept him as a Jew. So, although Mendelssohn had access to
all levels of society, and socialized with Berlins leading political figures, he never had a
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political existence of his own making. This was the price he paid for remaining Jewish in
a society where his role had already been prescribed for him. Indeed, many of
Mendelssohn’s friends simply acted as though he wasn’t a Jew, in order to feel more
comfortable accepting him.56
Mendelssohn’s indifference to politics was not all that different from Rahel’s
escape into her salon; and Arendt was critical of them both. The salons carried on the
tradition of political avoidance started by the Jewish intellectuals. Escape into the life of
the salon was commonplace, and even before the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars and
the downfall of the salon, conversion to Christianity and marriage into the Prussian
nobility was the norm for assimilated Jews. After the Napoleonic Wars, however, the
path to social acceptance that Mendelssohn and other Jews opened was now closed. Fullscale assimilation was the only option left open. It was either assimilate by renouncing
all ties to Judaism or suffer the consequences of social isolation. Rahel chose the former.
In her period of uncertainty Rahel had turned to the ideas of Fichte, in which she
found justification for a new kind of philosophical nationalism. Yet, the Prussian noble
class was not as eager to throw off the old bonds of birth and rank. They embraced their
own kind of nationalism, where Rahel would have to fully assimilate, leaving all vestiges
of herself and her “infamous birth” behind. To re-enter high society, and to define
herself politically as she had never done before, meant she had to deny any notions of
self-creation or self-identification outside Prussian noble society. In 1814, Rahel
solidified her decision when, upon converting to Christianity, she married Karl August
Varnhagen von Ense, a Prussian nobleman and member of the diplomatic corps. For
several years she followed her husband around in his diplomatic duties. She followed
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him to Vienna in 1815 where she saw firsthand the discussion deciding the fate of a postNapoleonic Europe. After Vienna Varnhagen was stationed in southwest Germany,
where he and Rahel remained until his retirement in 1819, upon which the two of them
returned to settle in Berlin.
Rahel’s seemingly unabated assimilation earned her the title of parvenu in
Arendt’s eyes. According to Arendt, a parvenu is a person who gains recognition and
inclusion into a society by completely abandoning any notions of self-identification
outside that society. Becoming a parvenu was a common path for both bourgeois and
Jewish individuals to be accepted into noble society. For the bourgeoisie this meant
playing into exclusionary practices like birth and rank by taking on titles of their own.
The bourgeoisie, however, was a growing power, and beginning to identify itself on its
own terms. Jews, on the other hand, “if they wanted to play a part in society, had no
choice but to become parvenus par excellence.”57 This path, to become a parvenu, was
still only open to exceptional Jews. Ordinary Jews had to first become exceptional, or
make themselves not like Jews, only then did they have a chance at complete social
assimilation.
As a parvenu Rahel managed to escape her Jewishness, but she soon realized that
if she wanted to keep her social and political status she would not only have to forget her
“infamous birth” as a Jew, but also everything else about herself before she became the
wife of a Prussian noble diplomat. This meant she would have to indefinitely become her
now formal title, Frau Friederike Varnhagen von Ense. She was not only leaving behind
Rahel Levin, the Jew, but she was also leaving the Rahel of the salon behind, the selfmade woman who lived according to truth and reason. This was something that Rahel
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could never come to terms with no matter how hard she tried. While away from Berlin,
Rahel immersed herself in her new lifestyle only to find out that it came up short of her
expectations. She understood she would have to leave her Jewishness behind, but she
thought she would still be able to create her own identity in other ways. As a parvenu
however there was no means to self-creation, only examples to follow. Rahel wrote,
“Now I have to behave toward people as if I were nothing more than my husband; in the
past I was nothing, and that is a great deal.”58 So Rahel began to re-create a life for
herself much as she had done in her salon earlier in life; but this life had to be lived
“altogether inwardly” through her letters and diaries, for Rahel learned all to well that she
could no longer express it outwardly.
Rahel truly believed in the genuineness of her experiences in the salon. She could
not “forget the insights she had, nor emancipate herself inwardly from them…no amount
of ‘civil improvement’ could compare with it.”59 For all her outer emancipation and
newfound political existence she could not emancipate herself from herself. “One had to
pay for becoming a parvenu by abandoning truth, and this Rahel was not prepared to
do.”60 Rahel’s marriage to Varnhagen was her attempt to see how far a Jewish-born
woman in nineteenth-century Prussia could go in the political realm. What she found
was the she could go very far by assimilating herself in every possible way, but it would
never be enough. Rahel gained a degree of political self-expression through her husband
that she could never have achieved in the salon alone. She was accepted into a part of
Prussian aristocratic society populated by those who ran the government at the highest
levels. In Vienna, the delegates to the Congress stayed with Rahel and her husband
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where she no doubt had many conversations with them on politics, society, and the state.
And of course she also had her husband’s ear. But that was as far as she could ever go.
She would never be allowed the same kind of political existence as her husband. She was
given a role to play, and she was expected to play it. After awhile she simply grew tired
of only doing what she was told. Her total assimilation had left her feeling like little
more than a hand-puppet. As a woman her political voice was no more genuine than
when she was a Jew in pre-Napoleonic times, all forms of genuine political participation
were still closed to her. She could get close, and indeed she did, but never actually
achieve her goal. She might have been able to leave her Jewishness behind, but she
would always be a woman, and as such be limited to the roles given to her.
Rahel’s experiment as a parvenu ultimately left her unsatisfied and she came out
the other end as a pariah. A pariah is a social outcast or one who has no place in society.
Jews in Rahel’s time were all pariahs to a certain extent, but Rahel made the leap to
become a “conscious pariah,” that is someone that recognizes their anti-social position
and tries to come to terms with it as part of their reality, rather than trying to escape it
through the mask of a parvenu. Rahel did not want to be Friederike Varnhagen any more,
and upon returning to Berlin in 1819 she had no desire to become Rahel Levin once again
either. She no longer had the will for “fraudulent self-identification” as Friederike, but as
Rahel Levin she was still a socially unacceptable Jew in post-war Prussia. Stuck in
between a parvenu and a pariah Rahel found solace in her attitude at a young age. Now
in her fifties, she admitted she saw herself in the same light that she did at fourteen or
sixteen. It was her idea of the self-made woman, defined on her own terms and no one
else’s, not even history’s. She wrote, “All my life I considered myself [just] Rahel and
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nothing else.”61 Thus, she returned to her old romantic notion of herself, a self created
through individual introspection.
In her waning years Rahel came to the realization that she was always a Jew,
whether or not she admitted it. It was only as a Jew that she could recognize her
humanity, as well as the humanity of others. Arendt writes,
In a society based upon privilege, pride of birth and arrogance of title, the
pariah instinctively discovers human dignity in general long before
Reason has made it the foundation of morality…The parvenu pays for his
loss of pariah qualities by becoming ultimately incapable of grasping
generalities, recognizing relationships, or taking interest in anything but
his own person…the pariah, precisely because he is an outcast, can see life
as a whole…this is his sole dignified hope: ‘that everything is related; and
in truth, everything is good enough.’62
Rahel’s Christianity, her marriage, and other parvenu qualities were never genuine. The
only truth she found in them was an answer to her seemingly impossible predicament of
being Jewish. But she never loved Varnhagen, and she did not have the tastes and
attitudes of a Prussian noble. Being a parvenu was ultimately untrue to herself.
Arendt focuses much of her thought and energy on the intricacies of social and
political assimilation because as a Jew under the Nazi regime she saw firsthand the
potentially fatal consequences of assimilation taken to its extreme.63 Most of Arendt’s
work in some way deals with the problems of the modern world seen under the
totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. In studying and defining totalitarianism
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Arendt created a single concept that epitomized everything unique about totalitarianism
and the forces that drove it; that concept was the idea of superfluous humanity.64 It
served as the conceptual basis for all of Arendt’s arguments in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, and its implications appear in Arendt’s thought throughout all her other
works. Although Arendt wrote most of Rahel Varnhagen before Origins, she was still
looking for answers to the problems of totalitarianism through the life of Rahel. Arendt
saw totalitarianism as the result of the modern world’s acceptance of superfluous
humanity. This superfluity, however, began much earlier than the twentieth century, and
Arendt goes all the back to Rahel’s time to find its roots. In Origins Arendt divides its
development into three steps or intervals, which culminate in the historical realization of
totalitarianism. Each of these steps—anti-semitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism—is
defined by a kind of superfluity, or dehumanization, which eventually led to the complete
disregard for human life of the totalitarian regimes.
Through the anti-semitism of Rahel’s age, and the attempts of enlightened and
romantic thinkers to deal with it, Arendt saw the development of her first stage—social
superfluity. Social superfluity usually appears as assimilation to the point of losing the
ability for self-identification outside the prescribed roles of a given society. Anti-Semitic
society, however, seeks to make the Jews socially superfluous whether they become a
part of that society or not. They either take the path of the parvenu and assimilate to the
point of self-annihilation65, or they choose the life of a pariah, remaining outside of
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society, superfluous to anything going on within it. “Jews felt simultaneously the
pariah’s regret at not having become a parvenu and the parvenu’s bad conscience at
having betrayed his people and exchanged equal rights for personal privileges.”66 In an
effort to curb the social superfluity of anti-Semitic societies both enlightened and
romantic thinkers focused on the idea of universal acceptance into society for everyone
based solely a recognition of their common humanity.67 This would mean that Jews
could become full members of society without having to destroy their means to selfidentification. But Arendt saw in these universal conceptions of mankind an
overemphasis on commonality that ultimately subsumed the inherent diversity of
humanity. To recapture the individual from this abyss, enlightened and romantic thinkers
over-emphasized individual subjectivity to the point where it isolated the individual from
all humanity, creating alienation and superfluity all over again. Alienation and
superfluity are symbiotic concepts. Alienated individuals often take the path of
assimilation, but if assimilation is pushed too far, then the system (or society) is unable to
differentiate individuality any longer and all members become superfluous. This created
the paradox of the modern world: how to combine individuality (whether rational or
introspective) and universalism in the same breath. Arendt saw through anti-Semitism
that some people would never be allowed to fully assimilate. They would always being
alienated and potentially superfluous. As Arendt understood it, the social superfluity
established in Rahel’s time eventually led to greater troubles in the following centuries
like economic and political superfluity, which we will discuss in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN THE MODERN WORLD
One of the most distinctive features of Hannah Arendt’s thought is her insistence
on the divide between “society” and “politics.” Her harshest criticisms in Rahel
Varnhagen are leveled at the parvenu, who substitutes social acceptance for genuine
political action. Yet, Arendt’s own conceptions of society and politics were anything but
static, and indeed she continued to work on them throughout her entire life, polishing her
thinking over an entire body of works. Richard Bernstein confirms that, “although Arendt
insisted on the distinction between society and politics, and emphasized the importance
of political responsibility and action by the Jewish people, she was initially quite vague
about the meaning of politics” (emp. in text).1 Likewise, her conception of “society”
underwent several changes before she settled on what she believed to be the defining
factors of the modern age.2 Over time, she continued to develop her understanding of
both society and politics, but always kept an emphatic separation between the two. In
this chapter I will discuss Arendt’s application of these concepts first to Jewish history
and question of Zionism, and then to the phenomenon of totalitarianism and its place in
the modern world.
High Society
In her 1974 work, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, Margaret Canovan
identifies high society as one of the “strands of meaning” that structured Arendt’s
thinking on the concept of society as such. “High society with its characteristics and
vices: the fashionable world, originally composed only of a tiny segment of the
1
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population, in which appearances were all important, and where the desire to be in
fashion and make a good impression led to an ape-like conformity and the vice of
hypocrisy.”3 The need for acceptance is a peculiar phenomenon, but it is also an
extremely powerful one. As Arendt saw it, certain individuals would go to great lengths
to ensure the approval of their cultural “betters,” completely alienating themselves from
the world around them and severing any connection to reality in the process. Again, for
Arendt this is the path of the parvenu, which I outlined in the previous chapter as a
central theme in Rahel Varnhagen.
In her next project Arendt wanted to take her ideas from Rahel and fully explain
their implications for society and politics in the modern world. She wanted to know all
the possible responses for the pariah, not just the path of the parvenu. What followed was
a series of provocative essays, posthumously collected and published under the title The
Jew as Pariah. 4 They were Arendt’s most comprehensive look at the “Jewish question”
to date. Although her ideas on the basic nature of pariahdom did not significantly
change, there is a break between Rahel Varnhagen and The Jew as Pariah that is much
more than just a shift in style. Arendt wanted to make the concept of pariahdom central
to the essays, but by the time she finished writing Rahel Varnhagen, roughly 1933,
Germany was in a state of social, political, and intellectual upheaval. Anti-Semitism
reached new heights, and Arendt seemed to be at a turning point in history, just as Rahel
had been. Over the next decade, Arendt’s life was forever changed by the Nazis’ rise to
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power. She saw firsthand many of the things come to fruition that she warned about in
Rahel Varnhagen. The devastating reality of the concentration camps and the Holocaust
gave Arendt a more fierce resolve than ever to expose the problems of the modern world
and to explain how such a thing could have happened.
Unlike Rahel, Arendt was not ashamed of her Jewish background, and she was
certainly not afraid to show it. Many scholars have pointed out that her analysis of Rahel
was a way for Arendt to better understand her own Jewish identity. The study of the
“Jewish question” drove her as both a scholar and a social pariah. As a young adult, she
began to actively participate in the Zionist movement, where she found the tutelage of
such Zionist intellectuals as Kurt Blumenfeld. Arendt came to greatly admire
Blumenfeld, and she soon saw him as the father figure she had always wanted.5 Her own
father died when she was very young, and it was something she was still dealing with as a
young adult. In the movement Arendt encountered ideas by Zionist intellectuals both old
and new, many of which formed the basis of her thinking on society, politics, and the
Jewish question for years to come. The Jew as Pariah essays (also called the New York
essays) were Arendt’s attempt to elucidate and analyze many of these ideas. But, there
was also a personal dimension to The Jew as Pariah based on Arendt’s own experiences
with totalitarianism.
When the Nazis came to power in 1933 it was clear to Arendt that anti-Semitism
was about to come to the forefront of German politics. Still, her resolve did not shrink,
and she continued to act openly and proudly as a Jew. Naturally, this brought her to the
attention of the Nazis, and she was arrested for Zionist activity that same year. After
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being held for a few days she was fortunate enough to be let go.6 Realizing how
dangerous the situation was and how close she came to her possible death, Arendt
decided to leave Germany for good. She took refuge in Paris, as did so many other
German intellectuals of her day, where she awaited the fate of the Jewish people, as well
as the fate of all of Europe. From the safety of Paris she watched as the Nazi and
Stalinist machines grew larger and more terrifying with each passing day. By 1940
Germany was ready to unleash its aggressions on neighboring France. In May 1940 the
French government, still independent of Nazi control, began placing ‘enemy aliens’ into
internment camps, in a last ditch effort to prepare themselves for invasion. Arendt was
sent to Gurs, in southern France near the Spanish border, where she, along with
thousands of other German immigrants, awaited the coming storm. Reflecting on her
time at Gurs, Arendt later wrote that contemporary history created a new kind of
humanity, one where people “are put into concentration camps by their foes and into
internment camps by their friends.”7 The disarray caused by the Nazi advance into
France that summer helped Arendt, as well as almost two-thirds of the other internees at
Gurs, secure liberation papers. Interestingly enough, Gurs became one of the largest
concentration camps in Western Europe, where many Jews who ended up at Auschwitz
and other death camps began their journey. By the end of the summer the Nazis had
overtaken all of France, including Gurs, and set up a sympathetic French government at
Vichy. While the ‘Aryans’ were accepted back into Germany, those with Jewish origins
waited uneasily to see what would happen next. In October of 1940 the Vichy
government decreed that all Jewish people must register themselves or be arrested.
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Arendt and many others refused to obey this order because they knew it meant they
would be sent to concentration camps. She decided then it was time to leave Europe
altogether and take refuge in America. In January 1941, after barely avoiding arrest,
Arendt and her husband, Heinrich Blucher, were able to obtain visas that allowed them to
leave for America via Lisbon, Portugal.
After arriving in America (New York City) Arendt went to work on the essays
that would later comprise The Jew as Pariah, but her personal experiences and the
catastrophes taking place in Europe were never far from her mind. Arendt was no longer
warning about the dangers of assimilation. She had seen the consequences, she knew
how real the death and destruction could be. The New York essays were meant to be a
wake up call for Americans as well as displaced Europeans as to what it truly meant to be
a Jew in the modern world. As the horrors of the Holocaust came to light, Arendt had all
the evidence she would ever need.
A Social Response to a Political Question
The central theme of the New York essays is Arendt’s critique of modern Zionism
from its inception at the end of 19th century to her own time, when Zion was no longer
just a dream. The first of these essays, “From the Dreyfus Affair to France Today”
(1942), introduces two of the most important figures of the early Zionist movement:
Theodor Herzl and Bernard Lazare. In 1896 Theodor Herzl published an extremely
influential pamphlet entitled The Jewish State, or Der Judenstaat, in which he laid out his
vision for the future of the Jewish people and the founding of a new Jewish state in
Palestine. He gained many followers very quickly and within a year he founded the First
Zionist Congress, which officially created the World Zionist Organization. Bernard
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Lazare made a name for himself shortly after in 1898 when he was elected to the Actions
Committee alongside Herzl at the meeting of the Second Zionist Congress. Yet, the two
men had very different ideas on what it meant to be a Jew in the modern world, as well as
what kind of thinking should define the Zionist movement. Unable to reconcile his ideas
with the dominant trends in Zionism, Lazare left the movement in 1899. From then on
Lazare fell into obscurity and Herzl’s Jewish State led the way in the Zionist movement
for the next fifty years. Despite Herzl’s popularity, in Arendt’s New York Essays she
clearly identifies more with Lazare. Much of her criticism of modern Zionism is the
accusation that it was ultimately a result of Herzl’s ideas and not Lazare’s. Thus, Lazare
becomes, in Arendt’s eyes, a forgotten hero of the Zionist tradition. Essentially, the New
York essays were her attempt to both revive and continue his work.
Before Arendt went into her full criticism of Herzl and his effect on modern
Zionism she wanted to explain in a pair of essays, “We Refugees” (1943) and “The Jew
as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition” (1944), all the possible responses to pariahdom and why
Lazare’s ideas were in fact the most apt and most significant for modern Jews. In “We
Refugees” Arendt uses her own unfortunate situation as an example of the utter failure of
assimilationist and parvenu attitudes towards the problems of pariahdom. Arendt says
that these options were no longer viable because in the modern world pariahdom was no
longer a social question but a political one. “So long as the Jews of Western Europe were
pariahs only in the social sense they could find salvation, to a large extent, by becoming
parvenus.”8 But, once the political action was taken to make assimilation impossible, as
in the Nuremberg race laws for example, and political rights were defined in the basis of
ethnicity, there was no longer room for either the parvenu or the pariah. Arendt writes,
8
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“History has forced the status of outlaws upon both, upon pariahs and parvenus alike.”9
In the end, parvenuism is not only “self-destructive” but also a source for the potential
destruction of all pariah groups. Arendt realized that “the outlawing of the Jewish people
in Europe has been followed closely by the outlawing of most European nations.” The
circle continues to shrink and shrink, eliminating difference each time it goes. This is
only reinforced by “the political and moral absurdities of trying to create ethnically
homogeneous nation-states out of multi-national societies.”10 Soon, entire groups of
people are kicked out of the state, “denationalized,” simply for being different. What
follows then is a mass of refugees, “stateless” people, with no place to exercise true
political action because no state will take them. Arendt argues “The comity of European
peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest member to be excluded
and persecuted.”11
No more is the parvenu’s lifestyle more seductive than to the refugee, who is
forced to flee from place to place, taking on new identities wherever he may roam.
Arendt makes light of her own experience saying, “After four weeks in France or six
weeks in America, we pretend to be Frenchmen or Americans.”12 The refugee is then
taken on the roller coaster of “megalomania and hopeless” that characterizes the life of
the parvenu because they so crave recognition, always looking for the next “sign” from
society as to their acceptance or rejection. “The smallest success so hard-won,
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necessarily dazzles him with an illusory: everything is possible; the smallest failure sends
him hurtling back into the depths of his social nullity.”13
In “A Hidden Tradition” Arendt discusses the concept of the conscious pariah as
the only political response to pariahdom. She calls it hidden because only a minority of
Jews in the modern world ever came to conclusion that they had be both political and a
pariah at the same time. Arendt credits Bernard Lazare with inventing the concept, which
for the first time brought the Jewish question in the arena of politics. Both Arendt and
Lazare speak of a duty for the conscious pariah not only to avoid the path of the parvenu,
but also take action against it.
He saw that what was necessary was to rouse the Jewish pariah to a fight
against the Jewish parvenu. There was no other way to save him from the
latter’s own fate—inevitable destruction. Not only, he contended, has the
pariah nothing but suffering to expect from the domination of the parvenu,
but he is destined to pay the price for the whole wretched
system…Politically speaking, every pariah who refused to be a rebel was
partially responsible for his own position14
And how does the pariah become a rebel? By entering into the realm of politics and by
engaging in genuine political action. Remember that this is impossible for stateless
persons because no state will allow them the opportunity to do so. Again, this is one of
the reasons Arendt is so critical of “high society” and why she insists on keeping it
separate from politics. Lazare and Arendt place the burden of responsibility on the
shoulders of pariah alone. Arendt argues that many of the problems that surfaced during
the Dreyfus Affair were the result of the actions of parvenus, but “immeasurably more
serious was the fact that the pariah simply refused to become a rebel.” The majority of
13
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Jews did not realize that by avoiding political action they turned themselves into a
“prop,” holding up the existing social order from which they were excluded.15
In addition to the conscious pariah, Arendt details three other responses to
pariahdom that, although different from being parvenus, still have negative consequences
because they equally fail to address the political aspect of being a pariah in the modern
world. The first of these is what Arendt calls the “lord of dreams”, the poet, or the
schlemiel. This is the pariah who seeks to escape the world in which he is a social
outcast, usually replacing it with a world of his own making. Rahel Varnhagen fit this
category for most of her life, and indeed Arendt accuses the whole of the salon culture as
being permeated with such thinking. She writes, “For the pariah, excluded from formal
society and with no desire to be embraced within it, turns naturally to that which
entertains and the delights the common people.”16 What Arendt meant by this was that
the pariah as a dreamer seeks a more egalitarian approach to existence. This of course is
epitomized in salon culture, where the pre-existing individual does not exist at all, and
everyone is judged based on one’s own created personality. Furthermore, Arendt
explains an exaltation of nature goes hand in hand with the pariah as a dreamer for
several reasons. First, the power of nature is more appealing to “the common people”
because of the disenchantment of the modern world. Over several centuries
secularization whittled away the thought of nature as a spiritual reality. But the idea still
remained in the back in the minds of the common people, who were outsiders to high
society anyway. Second, if high society has the power to exclude the pariah from its
ranks, then the pariah has to find a source of power for himself. The creation of a rival
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society serves this purpose very well, and indeed it was one of the key purposes for the
creation of the salon culture. But, creating a rival society and ensuring its existence is not
an easy task, as Rahel could attest to based on the destruction of her salon and the culture
accompanying it in 1806. Also, pariahs are labeled as pariahs precisely because they lack
to power to define themselves otherwise. So, the dreamer finds the answer in the power
of nature, where he devalues high society in the face of an overwhelming natural order.
Arendt writes that the dreamer cannot help but “smile to himself at the spectacle of
human beings trying to compete with the divine realities of nature. The bare fact that the
sun shines on all alike affords him daily proof that all men are essentially equal.”17
Confronted with the natural order of things, in which all is equally good,
the manifold classes and ranks must appear a comic, hopeless attempt of
creation to throw down the gauntlet to its creator. It is no longer the
outcast pariah who appears the schlemihl, but those who live in ordered
ranks of society and who have exchanged the generous gifts of nature for
the idols of social privilege and prejudice. (emp. added)18
For the dreamer, the reality of the social order, in which they are a pariah, is confronted
with the reality of a higher order. The social order then pales in comparison because the
higher reality is of course “natural.” Arendt chides this way of thinking by arguing the
poet’s cheerful indifference “could hardly be expected from the more respectable citizen,
caught up as he was in the toils of practical affairs and himself partly responsible for the
order of things.”19 Arendt is most critical of the dreamer because he is irresponsible, to
himself and to others, and he is essentially politically irresponsible, unwilling to engage
himself in any kind of true political action. Dreamers only want to “hold a mirror” up to
the political world, not join it.

17

Ibid.
Ibid., 72
19
Ibid., 73
18

60

A second response for the pariah is that of the suspect. She bases this concept on
the typical characters portrayed by Charlie Chaplin, the likable miscreant whose bad
name makes him presumably guilty for any and all wrong doing. His outsider status
solidifies him as a deviant and his deviance convinces normal society to make him an
outsider.20 The representatives of respectable society, of law and order, chase him
relentlessly, and the common man can not help but sympathize with him because they
“recognize in him what [high] society had done to them.” Therefore, the suspect is not
much different from the dreamer; both are essentially innocent, only being condemned
because of how high society labels them and they both appeal to the common people.
The suspect is fiercely independent and cares little for the conventions of high society,
but he does not pretend to dream of a higher reality where he is no longer an outcast. He
realizes his position, much as the conscious pariah does, but does not think he can change
it. He is instead “worried” and “careworn.” It is a sense of hopelessness that fills his
life.21
Arendt’s third response to pariahdom comes from her analysis of the writing of
Franz Kafka. She calls this concept “the man of good will.” The man of good will
analyzes his position as a pariah much the same way as the dreamer, by looking for a
common humanity in which he could also be included. But Kafka does not want to
escape the world; he is a realist, and he details the real problems of the pariah in his
novels. Coincidentally, the year that Arendt wrote “A Hidden Tradition” was also the
twentieth anniversary of Kafka’s death. So, in another article published that same year,
“Franz Kafka: A Revaluation,” Arendt similarly defends Kafka as a realist. She argues
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that the nineteenth-century novelist and his bourgeois readers “desired more events and
more happenings than the usually narrow and secure framework of his own life could
offer him.” Kafka, on the other hand, knew “in our world [the 20th century] real events,
real destinies, have long surpassed the wildest imagination of novelists.”22 As a man of
good will, “His desires are directed only towards those things, to which all men have, a
natural right…He demands no more than that which constitutes every man’s right…he
seeks nothing more than his minimum of human rights.”23 Yet, as Arendt notes, in doing
so he does exactly what the high society wants the pariah to do, to abandon any preexisting notions of self, to be “indistinguishable” from all others. Although Arendt
celebrated many of Kafka’s ideas, he still fell into the trap of the man of good will. She
writes:
In Zionism he saw means of abolishing the ‘abnormal’ position of the
Jews, an instrument whereby they might become ‘a people like other
peoples.’ Perhaps the last of Europe’s great poets, he could scarcely have
wished to become a nationalist. Indeed, his whole genius, his whole
expression of the modern spirit, lay precisely in the fact that what he
sought was to be a human being, a normal member of human society. It
was not his fault that this society had ceased to be human, and that,
trapped within its meshes, those of its members who were really men of
goodwill were forced to function within it as something exceptional and
abnormal (emp. added).24
Arendt finds something admirable in each of these responses to pariahdom, even if she is
critical of them as a whole. She praises each of her proto-types—Kafka, Chaplin, and
Heinrich Heine (a 19th century poet, Arendt’s dreamer)25—as contributing to the hidden
tradition and fighting against the tradition of assimilation, of the parvenu. Each of them
exhibited qualities of the conscious pariah, but remained deficient in one area. The
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dreamer is innocent and independent, but not a realist. The suspect is realist and is
innocent, but remains dependent on others for his refusal to take action. And finally, the
man of good will is independent and a realist, but is not innocent because he is willing to
label himself as a social pariah as long as he is included into humanity based on natural
rights.
In 1945 and 1946, as the Jewish State was coming closer to a reality, Arendt
returned to the question of modern Zionism and the legacy of Theodor Herzl. Zionism
was important to Arendt not only because of her personal involvement in the movement,
but also because it played such a major role in her theoretical constructions. The Zionist
was a conscious pariah and a rebel against society, but most important of all Zionism was
“the only political answer the Jews ever found to anti-Semitism.”26 In “Zionism
Reconsidered (1945)” and “Herzl’s Jewish State: Fifty Years Later” (1946) Arendt
argues that in modern Zionism all the ideological implications of Herzl’s Jewish State
came to forefront and any practical responses, even those proposed by Herzl himself, had
long since been forgotten. Arendt distinguishes between two types of modern Zionists:
socialists and nationalists. According to Arendt, the socialist Zionists cared only to
create a classless society of Jews in Palestine; “beyond that they had no national
aspiration.” They were only interested in the social aspects of the new state. The
nationalist Zionists, on the other hand, thought of nothing but the potential foreign policy
of the new state and what its relationship would be with anti-Semitic nations. Arendt is
quick to point out the peculiarities of such single-minded focus on both sides as socialist
Zionists emerged to fight nationalist oppression and nationalist Zionists found their

26

Origins, 120. This is in fact Arendt’s last sentence to her “Anti-Semitism” section of Origins, a perfect
summation of her thought on the subject.

63

identity because of social discrimination.27 Nationalist Zionists were for the most part
assimilated intellectuals, like Herzl, who could find no place “in the house of their
fathers.” There was simply no need for them in the network of international Judaism.
They were too assimilated into Christian culture to find a proper place among their
Jewish neighbors. They had long since abandoned the mystical superstitions of the
Jewish masses and did not have the connections into the business and family ties of the
upper class Jews. They were writers, teachers, and scientists who depended on either
Christian or secular culture to support them professionally. Jewish culture never
secularized itself enough to independently support and maintain such pursuits. Jewish
intellectuals had no place socially in international Judaism and no place politically in
anti-Semitic nations. Zionism then became
a solution to these men who were more assimilated than any other class of
Jewry and certainly more imbued with European education and cultural
values than their opponents…In sharp contrast to their eastern comrades
[socialist Zionists], these western Zionists were no revolutionaries at all;
they neither criticized nor rebelled against the social and political
conditions of their time; on the contrary they wanted only to establish the
same set of conditions for their own people.28
Herzl felt this way because of his conviction that anti-Semitism truly made Judaism what
it was. Anti-Semitism had always existed and it would continue to exist as long as there
were Jews. Herzl’s definition of Judaism
Presupposes the eternity of anti-Semitism in an eternal world of nations,
and moreover, denies the Jews part of responsibility for existing
conditions. Thereby it not only cuts off Jewish history from European
history and even from the rest of mankind; it ignores the role that
European Jewry played in the construction and functioning of the national
state; and thus it is reduced to the assumptions, as arbitrary as it is absurd,
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that every Gentile living with Jews must become a conscious or subconscious Jew-hater.29
Thus, Jewish political action can only take place in the unchanging structure of reality.30
Herzl’s escape from society into his own nation mirrors the response of the pariah as a
dreamer, and both ways are closed in the modern world. Ron Feldman writes in his
introduction to The Jew as Pariah, “Herzl’s Jewish State did not solve ‘the Jewish
question’…with sovereignty, the pariah people have not ceased to be a pariah—it has
created a pariah state.”31 Arendt argues that Zion is no longer a dream or a fantasy world,
but a real place with real problems, real Jews and real Arabs, and should be treated as
such.
A New Kind of Society
Arendt’s picture of society as “high society” forms the basis of her critique in
Rahel Varnhagen and The Jew as Pariah. High society seduces the parvenu into a life of
“ape-like conformity” that ultimately destroys him and all those around him. On the
other end, dreamers and poets only wish to run away from the overwhelming force of
high society. They form illusionary worlds where social difference disappears in the face
of natural equality. High society is not dealt with in any real way, only side-stepped and
pretended not to exist. Or it is re-created in the dreamer’s image, such as the salon
society’s attempt to remake high society in Berlin. Only conscious political action, “the
pariah as a rebel,” truly confronted the problems of high society. But as Arendt showed
with her critique of Herzl, even within Zionism political action could be tainted with the
dreams of a natural order and utopian ideologies.
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What started in Rahel Varnhagen as attempts to explain Jewish assimilation and
high society became much more when Arendt realized she could use those same concepts
to further her understanding of Nazism, totalitarianism, and the Holocaust as well. Thus,
while The Jew as Pariah was largely a summation of Arendt’s conceptual basis in Rahel
Varnhagen, it was also a preparation for her most ambitious project yet, The Origins of
Totalitarianism (1951). She realized that the path of the conscious pariah had never been
a popular choice. If pariahs did not choose conformity and assimilation then they chose
escape and denial. Arendt soon began to see the modern world as a result of such
behavior. What happens when the dreamer’s escape from reality, the suspect’s lack of
ambition, and the man of good will’s naiveté all overtake traditional high society? What
happens when they create a new society in their own image? Arendt found the answer in
her understanding of a new kind of society unique to the modern world: mass society.
Thus, in the New York essays Arendt is beginning to conceptualize her definition of
modern society, which may have elements of high society but is also something
altogether new. The Origins of Totalitarianism is also in many ways Arendt’s first
attempt to explain the origins of modern society.
In The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt Margaret Canovan defines a second
“strand of meaning” for society in Arendt’s thoughts alongside high society; she calls it
the “oikia enlarged.”32 In The Human Condition (1958) Arendt equates the “rise of
society” with “the rise of the ‘household’ (oikia) or of economic activities to the public
realm.”33 Arendt uses the Greek term oikia to demonstrate the break between ancient and
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modern “society.” Hannah Fenichel Pitkin writes in her book The Attack of the Blob:
Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (1998):
Contending that the ancient Greeks located all activities concerned
exclusively with survival, the needs of the body, and biological necessity
in the household, and noting the derivation of our word “economics” from
oikia, Arendt claims that for the Greeks economics was private. When, in
modern times, it went public, it became the social. 34
Arendt’s concern with economics is due to the fact that the development of a complex
market economy is one the hallmarks of modern society.35 The mindset of the modern
capitalist system pervaded all areas of society and politics. It was accompanied by a
complete social restructuring where high society gave way to “mass society.” Mass
society was something completely new. For Arendt the emergence of mass society was
such a pivotal event for the modern world that in her later works she tends to identify
“society” and “the social” solely as mass society. When she speaks of the emergence of
the social realm as a “relatively new phenomenon” she really means the emergence of
mass society.36 Mass society, however, is not the same as “the oikia enlarged,” because
that would imply that mass society is simply the private realm writ large, and such is not
the case. The social is “neither private nor public,” but instead “a curious hybrid
realm.”37 This is why in her book The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (1996)
Seyla Benhabib creates “mass society” as a third concept for society in Arendt’s
34
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thoughts, differentiating it from the “sociability” of high society and the purely economic
“oikia enlarged.” 38
Arendt’s shift towards economics and mass society is obvious in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, but she still only uses them with respect to the “Jewish question.” Thus,
The Origins of Totalitarianism serves as a mid-point in Arendt’s thinking between her
later works that focus almost exclusively on mass society and her earlier works where she
concerns herself with the culture of high society. Arendt begins her study with an
analysis of anti-Semitism as social phenomenon, while still noting its political
implications in the modern world. She then moves on to the effects of such thinking in
the economic realm, her first hint of analyzing society as mass society. And finally, she
reveals the deadly possible consequences that ensue when mass society supplants high
society, when everyone is potentially as “superfluous” as the next person.
According to Arendt, one of the greatest problems in Jewish history has been that
the Jews “always had to pay with political misery for social glory and with social insult
for political success.”39 This was so because the Jews occupied a unique position in
between the state and society. According to Arendt, Jews early modern Europe,
specifically “court Jews” and international financiers, were instrumental in the rise of
absolute monarchies and the nations-states that followed. She argues, “Jews were the
only part of the population willing to finance the state’s beginning and to tie their
destinies to its further development.”40 The Jews were the only class that owed their
existence to the state, and like the state, they stood apart from society. Therefore, their
special position in the state not only prevented them from immersing themselves into the
38
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existing class system, but also kept them from forming their own class as well.
Furthermore, Arendt contends, “each class of society which came into a conflict with the
state as such became anti-Semitic because the only social group which seemed to
represent the state were the Jews.”41 Ron Feldman writes:
Precisely because they were neither part of class society nor the state’s
politically active governing clique, the Jews were oblivious to the
increasing tension between state and society at the same time they were
driven towards the center of the conflict because they stood between the
two as part of neither. Politically naïve enough to believe that their true
lack of interest in power would be seen and accepted for what it was, they
were taken completely by surprise when twentieth-century political antiSemitism rose to power on the basis of charges of a Jewish world
conspiracy.42
During the Enlightenment, however, the political avoidance of the Jews was rewarded
with social acceptance. Assimilated Jews, who were accepted into high society as
exceptional Jews, represented a kind of achievement that the lower classes found
extremely enviable. Arendt writes, “Jews became the symbols of Society as such [high
society] and the objects of hatred for all those whom society did not accept.”43 Hated for
being a part of the state and the same time not a part of it, for being part of society and at
the same time not a part of it, it is no wonder that an escapist mentality pervaded Jewish
thought from the salon culture to Herzl’s Jewish State. With such a mentality Jewishness
and anti-Semitism became natural phenomena, outside the control of any reasonable
political action. Treating them as natural was a social tendency, meant to deal with social
discrimination, and not political reality. As a result, “society now not only defines some
people as pariahs and then seduces them into becoming parvenus, but it also disguises
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this activity as a natural inevitable process beyond human power.”44 A society detached
from reality where everything is placed into a natural order of things and everything is a
“process” is Arendt’s next step towards totalitarianism.
Next in Origins Arendt turned her attention to the “supposedly permanent
process” of economic expansion. Imperialism, as Arendt saw it, made expansion the
supreme and permanent aim of politics.45 Yet, endless growth is not really a political
principle at all, and eventually it proves disastrous for politics, because society (the
nation) and politics (the state) do not co-operate with one another, but are essentially
opposites. Arendt writes:
The secret conflict between state and nation came to light at the very birth
of the modern nation-state, when the French Revolution combined the
declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty.
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable heritage
of all human beings and as the specific heritage of specific nations, the
same nation was at once declared to be subject to laws, which supposedly
would flow from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no
universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself.46
The fight between society and politics then becomes an open “struggle for power,” with
politics being subsumed to the ends of society. Arendt argues that for imperialism the
key end of society is never-ending expansion, which is detrimental to politics.
Power became the essence of political action and the center of political
thought when it was separated from the political community which it
should serve. This, it is true, was brought about by an economic factor.
But the resulting introduction of power as the content of politics, and of
expansion as its only aim, would hardly have met with such universal
applause, nor would the resulting dissolution of the nation’s body politic
have met with so little opposition, had it not so perfectly answered the
hidden desires and secret convictions of the economically and socially
dominant classes. The bourgeoisie, so long excluded from government by
the nation-state and by their own lack of interest in public affairs, was
44
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politically emancipated by imperialism. Imperialism must be considered
the first stage in the political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last
stage of capitalism.47
Bourgeois society is definitely Arendt’s target here. With its emphasis on economics,
natural order, and natural processes, bourgeoisie society took the idea of an escape and
gave it political significance.
In a chapter entitled “The End of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of
Man” Arendt criticizes the Enlightenment conception of the abstract human being “who
seemed to exist nowhere” except in thought. She argues not for inalienable rights as
humans, but for concrete rights as citizens, “the right to have rights.” She argues that
more than just life and liberty, people need a “political community” in which to actively
engage their rights. The problem with modern pariahs as refugees and stateless people
“is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they
are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.”48 It is here that they become
completely “superfluous” not only to society and economics, but to politics as well.
Not the loss of specific rights, but the loss of a community willing and
able to guarantee any rights whatsoever has befallen ever-increasing
numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all the so-called Rights of
Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only
the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity…The conception of
human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as
such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed
lost all other qualities and specific relationships except that they were still
human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of
being human. (emp. added) 49
As social beings we are not equal because of wealth, rank and status, but even as abstract
human beings we are not actually equal, because the abstract man is a phantom concept
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that exists nowhere in reality. We become equal through political participation and a
mutual decision to guarantee rights to each other, to “build a common world,” a political
community.50 The nation-state for Arendt only promoted a false sense of equality and
homogeneity. As Richard Bernstein notes, “When this happens society triumphs over,
and obliterates, the very possibility of politics.”51 Hence, Arendt’s insistence on the
separation between the two.
Arendt argues that totalitarianism was unique in its attempts to make men
completely superfluous. Nowhere was this more evident than in the concentration camps,
where people were stripped of all their humanity, all possibility for meaningful action,
and reduced to “a bundle of reactions.” Arendt labeled this kind of treatment as “radical
evil.” In a letter to Karl Jaspers Arendt wrote:
What radical evil is I don’t really know, but it seems to me it somehow has
to do with the following phenomenon: making human beings as human
beings superfluous (not using them as means to an end, which leaves their
essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity;
rather making them superfluous as human beings). This happens as soon
as all unpredictability—which, in human beings, is the equivalent of
spontaneity—is eliminated. And all this in turn arises from—or, better,
goes along with—the delusion of the omnipotence (not simply with the
lust for power) of an individual man. If an individual man qua man were
omnipotent then there is in fact no reason why men in the plural should
exist at all. (emp. added)52
Radical evil seeks superfluity; totalitarianism seeks superfluity. It begins with the pariah
as an outcast, a socially superfluous person who either has to assimilate to the point of
self-destruction or remain outside of society, superfluous to anything going on within it.
Next, with the rise of imperialism entire groups of people become economically
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superfluous, whose only value is as surplus labor or surplus capital. Arendt notes the
usefulness of race-thinking for imperialism because it creates an entire class of socially
superfluous people to be exploited as economically superfluous. Finally, in
totalitarianism all traces of humanity are eliminated, as groups of people are denied their
right to even have rights, and placed in concentration camps where unthinkable
conditions eliminate spontaneity altogether. Still, Arendt did not believe in the
inevitability of totalitarianism. She talks about past events “crystallizing” into present
phenomena.53 It is an instantaneous act that occurs only within the fleeting present. Only
when the event has come and gone, does it illuminate its own origins. She adamantly
believed that an event cannot be pre-determined by inalienable truths, or deterministic
laws. Up to the last second, “there was always the real political possibility of preventing
its [totalitarianism’s] emergence.”54 That is why Arendt argues against an emphasis on
natural law; it disregards any hope of change and the hope for genuine political action to
actually make a difference in the world.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF HUMAN PLURALITY
Arendt’s arguments in The Origins of Totalitarianism were generally wellreceived, but a common criticism was that the book noticeably centered on the
development of Nazi totalitarianism, with Stalinism added only as an afterthought. To
correct this problem Arendt decided her next project would be to explore the role of
Marxist ideologies in the development of totalitarianism. During the next several years,
roughly 1952-1956, all of Arendt’s writings—her lectures, articles, and various essays—
were organized towards this end. She planned to gather them all together in a single
book, which she gave the tentative title of “Totalitarian Elements of Marxism.”1 Yet
despite forming a detailed outline and submitting applications for grants on the premise
that book was going to be written, Arendt never actually took the final step to organize
her arguments into a book-length discussion fit for publication. Instead, she decided to
hold onto her various writings and funnel them into her next three books, which came out
in rapid succession over the course of only four years: The Human Condition (1958),
Between Past and Future (1961), and On Revolution (1962).
Arendt chose to do this for several reasons. First of all, shortly after beginning
her analysis she realized that an examination of Marx, because of his importance, meant
nothing less than an examination of the entire tradition of political thought itself. Thus,
her “little study of Marx” very quickly grew beyond the scope of a single book.2
Secondly, Arendt was distracted by current events not only in America, but also in
Europe and Israel. In America, Arendt and her husband became increasingly nervous as
1
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McCarthyism took center stage. This was cause for alarm because neither of them were
full-fledged citizens. During this time, Arendt’s immediate concern over the campaign to
“make America more American” permeated her writings more than the abstract
intellectualism it would take to fully engage Marx. Nevertheless, the obvious anticommunist and anti-Stalinist overtones of this new Americanism still put Marx at the
center of much of her discussion. But until Arendt and her husband finally received their
citizenship in August of 1952, the two of them “lived in fear.”3 When it seemed that
Arendt might actually have to time to write her book, events in Europe once again
diverted her attention. The growing influence of French existentialism prompted her to
write “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought” (1954), in
which she commends the French existentialists for their revolutionary spirit and reaction
against traditional philosophy, but chides them for their adaptation of Marx simply to
“argue themselves out of the impasse of nihilism;” something, she argues, they had
created themselves.4 Likewise, developments in Russia made it difficult for Arendt to
make definitive statements about the effect of Marx on the political structure. With
Stalin’s death in March of 1953, no one was quite sure, Arendt included, what would
happen next. Then, in 1956, after Khrushchev gave his famous de-Stalinization speech, a
series of revolutions threatened Russia’s hold over the Eastern Bloc. Of these revolutions
Arendt was most intrigued by the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. It left a massive
imprint on her thinking, as we will see later in this chapter. Finally, in Israel, many of the
problems Arendt warned about in her New York essays did indeed come to light. And
although Arendt focused most of her intellectual energy on America and Europe, she
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could not help but notice the connection between European and Israeli nationalism when,
in 1952 with the Nationality Acts, Israel managed to exclude all but about 10 percent of
the Arab population from full citizenship.5
Arendt originally planned her study of Marxism in three parts, which, though
altered in many ways, reflect the themes she argues in The Human Condition, Between
Past and Future and On Revolution.6 The first part was meant to be an analysis of
Marx’s concept of man as a “working animal” and his elevation of labor as the highest
human capacity. Arendt kept this theme in The Human Condition, in which she
continually draws upon and critiques Marx to make her argument. Still, The Human
Condition is much less about Marx himself than Arendt’s own concepts of labor, work
and action. Arendt’s lectures from Princeton in 1953 entitled “Karl Marx and the Great
Tradition,” which were meant to form the second part of her book, found their way into
Between Past and Future, whose central theme is the impact of the tradition of political
thought on modern politics and history. Of the three books On Revolution diverged most
from its original topic. Arendt originally wanted the third section of her Marxism book to
explain how “the specifically totalitarian elements in Marxism are fully realized when
both the interest of the working class and the cause of the revolution are abandoned for
the sake of the global realization of an ideology.”7 Most of this argument found its way
back into The Origins of Totalitarianism instead, in an essay entitled “Ideology and
Terror,” which Arendt added to the 1958 enlarged edition. On Revolution turned out
mostly as the product of a lecture given at Princeton in 1959, which focused on the
French Revolution as a negative example of revolution and the American and Hungarian
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Revolutions as positive examples. Although Marx is present in the discussion, he is by
no means the centerpiece.
The Human Condition
One of the most common characterizations of The Human Condition is Arendt’s
nostalgia for the Greek polis, which can indeed be found with little stress. Some scholars
however, place this nostalgia at the center of Arendt’s entire way of thinking, labeling her
as an “anti-modern” philosopher who suffers from “polis-envy.”8 One of the reasons
Arendt receives this label is because The Human Condition is often seen as the most
definitive expression of her political philosophy. During her lifetime, in fact, this was the
label she most often received, even by such influential thinkers as Isaiah Berlin.9 It
wasn’t until after Arendt’s death that scholars began to go back and look for other
motivations for her thought. The first to do so was Ron Feldman in his introduction to
The Jew as Pariah in 1978. He writes:
There is an organic link between her conception of Jewish history and her
political theory: her view of the modern Jewish condition serves as an
introduction to her political theory, while her political theory illuminates
her interpretation of Jewish history.10
Feldman argues that Arendt’s ideal of the conscious pariah drove all her thinking on the
effects of assimilation and conformity in politics, which played a key role in her
understanding of totalitarianism. Though largely overlooked, Feldman marked the
beginning of shift towards understanding Arendt in terms of her Jewish identity and her
reaction to totalitarianism as a Jew. According the Seyla Benhabib, the first challenge to
the reigning notion of Arendt’s Grecophilia came from Elizabeth Young-Bruehl’s
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influential biography, For Love of the World (1982). Arendt’s personal involvement in
Jewish politics, as well her intense reflection on the events of the twentieth century,
showed Young-Bruehl that Arendt’s primary motivation for her thought came from her
experiences with totalitarianism. However, while Young-Bruehl’s argument holds up
biographically, she leaves its theoretical implications largely unanswered. Thus,
philosophically, Arendt was still identified by the pro-Homeric, anti-modern theme of
The Human Condition. Margaret Canovan’s Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her
Political Thought (1992) was the first attempt to explore the theoretical implications of
Young-Bruehl’s argument. Canovan wants to dismantle the notion that The Human
Condition somehow stands alone from all of Arendt’s previous works. Using the
proposed “Totalitarian Element in Marxism” discussed by Young-Bruehl, Canovan
argues, “Not only is The Human Condition itself much more closely related to The
Origins of Totalitarianism than it appears to be, but virtually the entire agenda of
Arendt’s political thought was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of the
mid-century.”11 She argues Arendt’s theory of action was rooted much more in her
response to totalitarianism than in her nostalgia for the Greek polis. Even so, Canovan
argues that Origins should not take the place of The Human Condition as Arendt’s
magnum opus. She is adamant about the fact that there is no one single publication that
can be regarded as the definitive statement of Arendt’s political thought.12 Despite
Canovan’s warning, Arendtian scholarship today is largely divided into two camps: those
who place Origins and Arendt’s Jewish identity at the center of her thought and those
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who remain convinced that The Human Condition weighs more on the political
implications of Arendt’s thought than anything preceded it. Even those who want to
replace the image of Arendt as simply an anti-modernist lover of the Greek polis, like
Seyla Benhabib, have to conclude that in Arendt’s thought, “It is the capacity for speech
and action that creates and sustains the political.”13 The similarity to the Homeric
exaltation of “words and deeds” is hard to deny.
Arendt’s arguments in The Human Condition originate from the philosophical
dualism between the two modes of human activity. The first mode is called the vita
activa and encompasses all the activities of the body. The second mode is the vita
contemplativa and encompasses all the activities of the mind. If the vita activa is
characterized by action, then the vita contemplativa is characterized by inaction. In other
words, the two modes can be simplified as the dichotomy of thought versus action. In
The Human Condition Arendt wants to explain the condition of the vita activa—divided
into labor, work, and action—in the modern world. But in order to do so, she has to first
explain the relationship between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa in the ancient
world. In the pre-Socratic polis, thought was secondary to speech and action. Homer
praises Achilles as “the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words.” Within the
vita activa speech and action stood as the highest capacities of man. The lowest action
was the labor of the slave followed by the work of the craftsman. What made these
activities inferior to speech and action is that they were subject to necessity. The
necessities of life, for the Homeric Greeks, were private activities by nature, occurring
solely within the realm of the household. To create a public realm, where action could
truly be free, it could not be tainted by necessity, because necessary action is, by
13

Benhabib, xxix

79

definition, not free. Thus, the polis was the only place man could reach his highest
potential as man. Inherent in this idea was the Greek conception of immortality. The
gods were immortal; nature was immortal. Man, on the other hand, was defined by his
very mortality in an immortal world. The only way man could overcome this mortality
was to be remembered forever, namely through the greatness of his “words and deeds.”
Such greatness, however, cannot be achieved if man is subject to necessity. He must be
free to act as he chooses, and not as he is forced to do.14
The supremacy of the vita activa first came under attack when Plato and Aristotle
claimed that action was not the highest capacity of man and that being remembered was
not his ultimate goal. They argued that it was man’s capacity for reason that set him
apart from nature and the lower animals. Through reason man could discover the order
of things in the world around him and be given a glimpse of the divine. Arendt contrasts
this to the idea of immortality by calling it eternality. The highest end of the vita
contemplativa was to enlighten oneself with a glimpse of the eternal. Whether it was
eternal Beauty or Goodness, or later an eternal God, it was the idea of a Being outside of
time, transcendent to time. Immortality is ever-lasting life within time, eternality goes
beyond it.15 Thus, Plato and Aristotle began a tradition of political thought that placed
thought (vita contemplativa) above any kind of action (vita activa). Arendt argues this
tradition lasted into the modern era, until Marx finally turned it back on its head, placing
action over thought once again. Arendt argues, however, Marx also reversed the
hierarchy within the vita activa, so that pure action was no longer the highest activity but
the lowest. Labor, once the lowest of all human activities, suddenly became the highest
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and most human action of all. With the victory of labor in the modern world, Arendt
believes that man lost both his Socratic eternity and his Homeric immortality.16 The
majority of The Human Condition is devoted to explain how this happened.
The pre-Socratic polis was identified by its sharp distinction between private and
public. The modern world, instead, is defined by the combination of both private and
public into a new realm, the social realm. This differs from the Greek polis because
Arendt argues that the modern social realm excludes the possibility for action. Instead, it
“expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and
various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ is members, to make them behave, to
exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.”17 Arendt returns to the salon
society to explain the reaction against such conformism. Once again the ideas of
Rousseau are at the center of her critique. According to Arendt, Rousseau wanted to save
the individual from “society’s unbearable perversion of the human heart.” He wanted to
create a new kind of intimacy, which ultimately meant an individual isolated from the
rigors of society and known to himself only through introspection. Like Arendt’s
“dreamer” in her New York essays, Rousseau believed only an escape from society could
save the individual from complete assimilation.18 But for Arendt, this did not do away
with the idea of conformism in society. Instead, it only reinforced conformity by
acknowledging all public conditions could be the same for everyone as long there was a
private, “intimate,” place left for the individual to escape into, where he could reside with
all his differences. Arendt writes, “The victory of equality in the modern world is only
16
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the political and legal recognition that society has conquered the public realm, and that
distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual.”19 Arendt is
quick to point out that in the polis it was the public realm, and not the private, where
expressions of individuality took place.
A central theme in The Human Condition is Arendt’s analysis of the concept of
ownership. The modern emphasis on the private character of individuality was followed
closely by the idea of private ownership. If the individual indeed has no place in the
public realm then ownership can be a strictly private matter, because the first and most
basic idea of ownership is that the individual owns his own person, and it is something he
can share with no one. From the idea of ownership came the ideas of property and
accumulation of wealth, attributed to John Locke and Adam Smith respectively. If the
private individual can indeed own himself, then he can own almost anything attached to
his private person. Furthermore, it is this ownership of property that maintains the
independence of the individual from the surrounding public realm. The loss of property
then goes hand in hand with the loss of individuality.
Arendt argues that the result of such a mentality led to the degradation of action
and the exaltation of production, because actions, that is pure actions that leave no
product behind and exhaust themselves in the act itself, cannot be owned the same way as
products can. Both Locke and Smith judged production by the durability of its products.
The more durable a product, the easier it is to own as property (Locke) or exchange for
something else (Smith). Arendt calls this activity work because unlike labor, its products
are meant to build a lasting world of things in which human interaction can take place.
Labor, on the other hand, produces for the sole purpose of consumption. Consumables
19
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by nature have a very short durability. Food, if left unattended will rot and return back to
nature within a very short amount of time. The products of work, such as a building or a
table, instead last much longer. Thus, in the concept of property and ownership, work
became the highest activity in the vita activa, followed by labor, which although
produced in a very limited capacity, was still more productive than pure action, which
produced nothing at all.
Arendt argues that elevating work as the highest activity is detrimental to the
public realm for several reasons. First of all, it replaces the idea of acting with the idea of
making.20 Work has a clear beginning and a clear end; it is a process that ends with
product itself. Action, on the other hand, is defined by its unpredictability, its unknown
end. “The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of
any action is simply that action has no end.”21 Making understands things only in their
potential use as a means to a desired end. The fabricator, or homo faber as Arendt calls
him, looks at a tree and sees a table. The tree is a means to an end, which is to produce
an object. In this sense, homo faber is very destructive of nature, and eventually
destructive the public world of things he has built himself. For homo faber, once an
object enters the world it becomes nothing more than a potential means to another desired
end. Despite his best efforts at permanence, homo faber achieves the exact opposite
because there is nothing that he does not see in terms of its potential use, which
ultimately means its destruction. Arendt argues, “As long as we believe that we deal with
ends and means in the political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody’s using all
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means to pursue recognized ends.”22 Homo faber confuses utility, “in order to,” with
meaningfulness, “for the sake of.” Utility becomes meaningful in itself, and something is
meaningful only if it is useful. To combat this assumption Arendt borrows her favorite
quote from Lessing, who asked “And what is the use of use?”23 For Arendt, “The
modern age was as intent on excluding political man, that is, man who acts and speaks,
from its public realm as antiquity was on excluding homo faber.”24
Up to this point, although Locke and Smith replaced pure action (or genuine
political activity in Arendt’s mind) with productivity, they still held to the supremacy of
reason (vita contemplativa) over all modes of action (vita activa). Man needed reason to
discover the purpose of his productive capacities; otherwise they would be pointless and
chaotic. Thus, Smith speaks of “enlightened self-interest,” so that man’s individual
production and exchange capacities are still guided by his capacity for rational thought.
Marx, however, was the first philosopher to argue that man’s productive capacities were
indeed his most human qualities, even above his ability to reason. With this idea, Marx
reversed the hierarchy of thought and action that stood for over two thousand years.
Already inherent in the idea of ownership was the idea that man can own his own private
person. Marx simply changed the meaning of that private person. If man truly wanted to
own himself, then he needed to own his most basic attribute as a human being, his laborpower. The products of his work could be separated from him, but his labor, because it
served the basic necessities of his life, was inexorably tied to his very being. If man was
to own himself, then it seemed obvious that the first thing he should own should be his
life process. The modern world, as Marx saw it, alienated man from his own life process,
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because he was not allowed to own his own labor power. Thus, modern man was in
essence alienated from himself. Marx’s solution was to do away with private property
altogether. Taking Locke and Smith to their logical extreme, Marx concluded that the
only thing man should own should be himself, meaning the essential definition of
himself, his labor-power. The problem Arendt had with the elevation of labor as the
highest human capacity was that it made necessity the quintessential question of the
public realm. Necessity by definition was a private matter in the ancient world. Since
necessity was now public, Marx concluded that the only way to eliminate necessity was
to eliminate the public realm altogether.
With both labor and work being ultimately destructive of the public realm, Arendt
makes the case for pure action as our fundamental public activity as humans. If the
necessities of life condition the activity of labor, and the production of things (which
Arendt calls worldliness) condition work, then the fact that we share a common world
with each other, that we exist as a plurality, conditions our speech and action. Arendt
writes, “with word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world…this insertion is
not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work.”25
For Arendt, the connection between speech and action is inseparable.
Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no
longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if at
the same time he is the speaker of words. The action he begins is humanly
disclosed by the word, and though his deed can be perceived in its brute
physical appearance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant
only through the spoken word in which he identifies himself as the actor,
announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.26
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In defining who we are, rather than what we are, speech and action are about being with
others, in “sheer human togetherness,” which is neither for nor against each other.27
Action, unlike work and labor, cannot take place in isolation, and thus must maintain a
public realm in which to act. The political realm is then created as men act together in
the public realm. For Arendt, the polis was not the city-state itself, but the in-between
space in which people spoke and acted towards one another.28 That in-between space is
the public realm.
Between Past and Future
Arendt continues her critique of the tradition of political thought in Between Past
and Future. As she explained in The Human Condition, many of the problems of the
modern world arose from the substitution of making for acting. Arendt continues this
line of thinking in Between Past and Future by arguing that such an idea was actually
part of the tradition of political thought long before Locke and Smith made it the center
of their arguments. In fact, it lay at the very core of the tradition because Plato, with
whom the tradition began, gave preference to all actions that have perceivable or even
natural ends. This was a definitive break from the Homeric tradition that emphasized
action whose ends could never be known precisely because of the unpredictable nature of
action. Arendt clearly favors the latter, because for her, Homeric action was indeed free
action. Jerome Kohn writes in his introduction:
The Greek experience, which she finds disclosed in the works of Homer,
Sophocles, and Thucydides, none of whom was a philosopher, is of
freedom, of not being bound to or by anything, of imitating utterly new
things for which no patterns exist, things that would never appear in the
world “naturally,” that is through the ever-recurring processes of nature.
But when Aristotle, following and somehow completing Plato’s thought,
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said that if nature were to build a house it would do so as we do—first
growing the foundation, next the walls, and then the roof—the implication
is that human agency imitates natural processes and, more important, that
human action is a kind of craft, a technique of “making.” It is the
conception of action as making that commenced the tradition of political
thought.29
This is the fundamental reason why Arendt rejects the tradition of political philosophy
outright, and claims not to be a philosopher herself. Yet, Arendt did not think she was
the one ending the tradition. Instead it had ended a century earlier “when a philosopher
turned away from philosophy so as to ‘realize’ it in politics.”30 That philosopher was
Marx. Again, Arendt is referring back to her arguments in The Human Condition, where
she explains Marx’s reversal of the hierarchy between thought and action, as well as the
ultimate substitution of labor not only for work but for pure action as well. The end of
the tradition is important for Arendt because it reveals the problems inherent in the
tradition itself. She explains, “The elementary problems of politics never come as clearly
to light in their immediate and simple urgency as when they are first formulated and
when they receive their final challenge.”31 Arendt is clear to point out, however, that
Marx still thought in terms of the tradition began by Plato and Aristotle, but whereas they
thought the state should escape necessity at all costs32, Marx thought it was precisely the
job of state to confront necessity, and ultimately eliminate it. With necessity eliminated,
the need for the state would vanish as well.
In a section titled “What is Freedom,” Arendt explicitly connects her ideas of
action and politics to the idea of freedom. Similar to her distinction between the vita
29
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activa and vita contemplativa, Arendt differentiates between freedom of thought and
freedom of action. “Inner freedom,” she writes, is “the inward space into which men may
escape from external coercion and feel free. This inner feeling remains without outer
manifestations and hence is by definition politically irrelevant.”33 Inner freedom,
“presupposes a retreat from the world…into an inwardness to which no other has
access.”34 Freedom of action, which Arendt equates with the freedom of the polis,
“needed a common public space…into which each of the free men could insert himself
by word and deed.”35 Thus, “the raison d’etre of politics is freedom, and its field of
experience is action.”36 Action and politics guarantee a public realm in which freedom
can appear. Arendt argues, however, “the philosophical tradition is almost unanimous in
holding that freedom begins where men have left the realm of political life.”37 The
reigning notion of freedom has always been inner freedom. Action, on the other hand,
“insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect not under the dictate of
the will—although it needs both for any particular goal.”38 “Freedom as related to
politics is not a phenomenon of the will.”39 For Arendt, the equation of a free will with
political freedom is one the most rampant fallacies in the philosophical tradition.40
Echoing the arguments in her final work The Life of the Mind, Arendt argues that a free
will alone is not sufficient for political freedom, because the will is part of the vita
contemplativa, and as such can only conceive of freedom as inner freedom.

33

Ibid., 145
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 147
36
Ibid., 145
37
Ibid., 155
38
Ibid., 150
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid., 156
34

88

In modern times, she argues, the gap between freedom and politics grew even
larger when political thinkers equated freedom with sovereignty. Returning to her
favorite target, Arendt identifies Rousseau as the “most consistent representative of the
theory of sovereignty, which he derived directly from the will, so that he could conceive
of political power in the strict image of individual will-power.”41 The consequence of
such thinking for Rousseau was that “he held that in an ideal state ‘the citizens had no
communications one with another,’ and that in order to avoid factions ‘each citizen
should think only his own thoughts.’” This meant a state rooted not in human plurality,
but instead one rooted in “extreme individualism.”42 In one of her most stinging
criticisms of Rousseau she writes, “A state…in which there is no communication
between the citizens and where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a
tyranny.”43
In an essay entitled “Arendt, Rousseau, and Human Plurality in Politics” (1983)
Margaret Canovan argues Arendt’s distaste for Rousseau resulted from the fact that
The two offered fundamentally different solutions to the problem of
human plurality in politics. Whereas Rousseau tried to unite the citizens
under a single General Will, Arendt stressed the importance of a common
public world within which plural citizens can be contained.44
Yet Canovan argues, despite their virtually opposite conclusions on plurality, both Arendt
and Rousseau were “strikingly similar” thinkers and shared “a good deal in common.”45
Perhaps that is why Rousseau appears as a target in almost all of Arendt’s major works.
Theoretical difference is magnified at its greatest when two thinkers can agree on many
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different things except a few key points, in which they arrive at completely opposite
conclusions. Arendt’s concept of action is rooted in her concept of novelty, meaning one
of action’s most admirable characteristics is its ability to create something new. She
continually stresses the Augustinian idea “that there be a beginning, man was created,
before whom there was nobody.”46 Canovan argues that such an emphasis on beginnings
naturally led Arendt to engage the social contract thinkers, with Rousseau being at the
forefront of such thinking. Canovan labels Rousseau and Arendt as “participationists,”
meaning both eschewed representative politics for “face-to-face involvement by the
ordinary citizen.”47 Rousseau’s ideas led to new ideas in popular sovereignty, and Arendt
of course thought genuine political action was the essence of freedom. Furthermore,
neither Arendt nor Rousseau believed that inevitable historical processes controlled
politics; both believed in the possibility of cooperative human action. Along this line,
Canovan contends that at the heart of Rousseau’s Social Contract lies the idea that the
political realm and political justice are not the outcome of natural law, but instead, are
brought about by man-made rules. For both Rousseau and Arendt, politics is the result of
human action. Human action both creates and maintains the political realm; “Citizens
must invent rules of justice for themselves.”48 Where the two differed is in their
respective solutions to the problem of how this action should be structured. Rousseau
conceived of the notion of a General Will, in which all the conflicting wills of the people
as private individuals were combined into a single will as public citizens. Arendt found
this idea atrocious because it flew in the face of all her ideas about the dangers of
assimilation and social conformity. As stated earlier, Arendt believed that Rousseau did
46
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not escape social conformity by replacing it with political equality, as he had hoped, but
instead only reified the notion of a homogeneous public, one which destroyed human
plurality. Because plurality is the keystone for Arendt’s concept of action, and indeed her
entire way of thinking about politics, she continually saves her harshest criticisms for
Rousseau.
On Revolution
If the French Revolution can be thought of as an extension of the Enlightenment,
a realization, or at least a consequence of its ideals, then quite possibly Arendt’s most
vehement attack on the Enlightenment comes in On Revolution (1962), where she
accuses the French Revolution of being the harbinger for the modern notion of the nationstate. Arendt’s greatest critique of the French Revolution was that it brought the idea of
necessity into the realm of politics. This was followed philosophically by Hegel’s, and
then Marx’s, notion of historical necessity, which is precisely the kind of political
thought that gave birth to totalitarianism. In the French Revolution the idea of necessity
came in the form of “The Social Question.” For Arendt, the social question was the
existence of poverty, with poverty being the ultimate condition of necessity. Arendt
argued that all the subsequent problems arising from the French Revolution were due to
the fact that the inherently anti-political phenomenon of necessity had not only worked its
way into politics, but came to be the very definition of politics. When the French poor
crashed onto the scene of the Revolution, driven by their bodily needs, they brought the
idea of necessity with them. From then on economic factors were transformed into
political factors and explained into political terms.49 The American Revolution
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succeeded precisely because it was not driven by the question of poverty, but instead by
the right for free political action.50 For Arendt, this was an exception to the rule, because
in Europe the question of poverty was the center of every revolution for nearly a hundred
and fifty years, until the Hungarian Revolution finally broke the pattern in 1956. It was
not just the poor who brought the idea of necessity with them to the political realm, but
the entire Revolution eventually shifted to center itself on fulfilling the burdens of
necessity. Robespierre abandoned his notion that freedom should be preserved at all
costs and replaced it with the idea that necessity should be serviced at all costs.
Suddenly, “the most sacred of all laws” became “the welfare of the people.” Arendt then
argues that, “It was necessity, the urgent needs of the people, that unleashed the terror
and sent the Revolution to its doom.”51 As seen in her analysis in Origins, Arendt was
already very critical of the Rights of the Man. In On Revolution she takes her critique a
step further when she realizes that the French Revolution not only exalted the Rights of
Man but ultimately transformed them into the “Rights of the Sans-Culottes.” The most
basic Right of Man became freedom from necessity, and this freedom was not meant to
be a basic social right, but a basic political right instead. From then on it was the duty of
the state to ensure this right.
Arendt argues such thinking first began with a fundamental shift from the idea of
the consent of the people to the idea of the will of the people. The greatest proponent of
new idea was once again Rousseau. She writes:
It is obvious that under these circumstances, ancient theory, with its
emphasis on the popular consent as a prerequisite of lawful government,
could no longer be adequate, and to the wisdom of hindsight it appeared
almost a matter of course that Rousseau’s volunté générale [general will]
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should have replaced the ancient notion of consent…the very word
‘consent’, with its overtones of deliberate choice and considered opinion,
was replaced with the word ‘will’, which essentially excludes all processes
of exchange of opinions and eventual agreement between them. The will,
if it is to function at all, must indeed be one and indivisible.52
Here, Rousseau attempts to combine politics and the individual into a single entity guided
by a common will. Robespierre echoed this idea crying, “One will is necessary, ONE!”53
The state itself became like an isolated individual: subject to necessity, cut off from
reality, and unable to comprehend anything outside itself. “While this emotion-laden
insensitivity to reality was quite conspicuous already in Rousseau’s own behavior, his
fantastic irresponsibility and unreliability, it became a political factor of importance only
with Robespierre, who introduced it into the factional strife of the Revolution. (emp.
added)”54 Arendt compares this to the American Revolution that sought to maintain the
plurality of its people. “They knew that the public realm in a republic was constituted by
an exchange of opinion between equals, and that this realm would simply disappear the
very moment an exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the
same opinion.”55 There is an implied argument here in which Arendt, while certainly not
alleviating Robespierre of his own guilt, places the burden of the ideas behind the Reign
of Terror squarely on the shoulders of Rousseau.56
Arendt suggests another reason why the idea of necessity came to the forefront of
the French Revolution was the emphasis on combating hypocrisy. Arendt writes “It was
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the war upon hypocrisy the transformed Robespierre’s dictatorship into the Reign of
Terror.”57 In addition to the disgust for eighteenth-century high society, personified by
the corruption-laden Court at Versailles, Robespierre’s war on hypocrisy was also meant
as a means for “stripping the mask off the disguised traitor.” Concerned with finding
genuine appearances in a chaotic time, such thinking eventually led Robespierre and
others to conclude that only ‘natural man’ in his ‘original state’ was un-hypocritical. In
other words, only a man who appears in public driven by his “naked need” cannot be
driven by hidden motives, and thus will always appear un-hypocritically. Necessity was
the only genuine appearance.58 Robespierre developed an idealized view of the lower
classes as the only truly un-hypocritical group in the Revolution. From that point on, his
entire concept of politics was driven by his newfound conception of necessity.
Following in the footsteps of the French Revolution, Hegel and Marx took the
idea that necessity was indeed the only genuine appearance and gave it a philosophical
restructuring. Hegel used it to develop his concept of historical necessity. Arendt
writes, “Theoretically, the most far-reaching consequence of the French Revolution was
the birth of the modern concept of history in Hegel’s philosophy.”59 Because Hegel
argued that Being manifests itself in history, he felt the need to rid history of all its
hypocrisy and uncertainty. In doing so he could then discover the pattern of Being in
history, which he called the world spirit. In using the idea that necessity defines genuine
appearance, Hegel created his laws of historical necessity, which he then tied to a greater
Being that works itself out over the course of history.60 Anything that was once
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political—words and deeds—became historical, subject to the laws of historical
necessity. Human beings then lose their ability to act in history; they can only observe its
laws. After Hegel, Marx took the idea of necessity to its theoretical extreme, which
ultimately resulted in the end of the tradition of political thought itself, as we have seen.
Despite the fact that Marx still felt necessity created genuine appearance, as can be seen
in his insistence on the purity of labor, he still felt that the purpose of the state was to
confront necessity and ultimately eliminate it as a public phenomenon. Once such a task
was complete then the state could “wither away.” Once Marx made this leap, “the
history of modern revolutions seemed to have reached a point of no return.”61 The
Russian Revolution, in Arendt’s eyes, finished everything the French Revolution began.
Arendt’s critiques of Marx in The Human Condition and Between Past and Future, as
well as her critique of Marxist ideology in Origins, all began with her critique of Marx’s
philosophy as the realization of ideals set forth during the French Revolution.
In The Human Condition Arendt remarked on the characteristic of novelty in
action. Action is defined only by its beginning because, according to Arendt, the end of a
truly free action can never be known. An action with a precise end in mind is not free
action, but is the means/end mentality of work, of making something. In On Revolution
Arendt argues that the idea of action as novelty was first realized in politics during the
eighteenth-century revolutions, “where man began to be aware that a new beginning
could be a political phenomenon, that it could be the result of what men had done and
what they could consciously set out to do.”62 This meant that the “new world order” was
not necessarily the design of Providence, but the result of conscious action. It may seem
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odd that for all her criticisms of the French Revolution Arendt actually describes it as one
the first instances in the modern world of men acting into the political realm. This is
because she does not have a negative opinion of revolutions themselves. In fact, she
argues, they are the best place to find pure action in the modern world. Modern
revolutions are defined by their novelty, their emphasis on creating something new.
Events such as the American and Hungarian revolutions showed Arendt that revolution in
itself could indeed be a re-vitalization of the ancient action ideal, a revolution based on
establishing a realm of freedom, a place where true political action could take place. It is
no coincidence that Arendt’s On Revolution came on the footsteps of the Hungarian
Revolution; her argument was largely an argument for revolution as such. Arendt’s
distaste for the French Revolution did not develop because it was a revolution (as others
such as Burke cried), but because it completely squandered its potential as a revolution.
Instead, it created a false revolutionary ideal dominated by necessity that came to
influence all notions of revolution for the next one hundred and fifty years.
No revolution has ever solved the ‘social question’ and liberated men from
the predicament of want, but all revolutions, with the exception of the
Hungarian Revolution in 1956, have followed the example of the French
Revolution and used and misused the mighty forces of misery and
destitution in their struggle against tyranny and oppression. And although
the whole record of past revolutions demonstrates beyond doubt that every
attempt to solve the social question with political means, leads into terror,
and that it is terror which sends revolutions to their doom, it can hardly be
denied that to avoid this fatal mistake is almost impossible when a
revolution breaks out under conditions of mass poverty. What has always
made it so terribly tempting to follow the French Revolution on its
foredoomed path is not only the fact that liberation from necessity,
because of its urgency, will always take precedence over the building of
freedom, but the even more important and more dangerous fact that the
uprising of the poor against the rich carries with it an altogether different
momentum of force than a rebellion of the oppressed against their
oppressors.63
63

Ibid., 102

96

When the Hungarian Revolution broke out based on action and freedom—not
necessity—Arendt felt a renewed justification for her entire way of thinking.
Arendt’s enthusiasm was of course not conditional to the success of the
Hungarian Revolution, as it did not last long in the face of overwhelming Soviet
force. Instead, she found great encouragement in the fact that revolution itself
escaped the shadow of the French Revolution, that revolution based on action and
freedom was still possible in the modern world. This gave her a newfound hope
for both humanity and politics. The confidence she expresses in her three books
following the Hungarian Revolution could very well have been a result of the
revolution itself.
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CHAPTER 4
ARENDT, KANT, AND THE SEARCH FOR EICHMANN’S CONSCIENCE
In 1961, while On Revolution was getting ready for publication, something
happened that forever changed Arendt’s image and legacy as a scholar. Israel announced
the capture and forthcoming trial of infamous Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann.
Seeing a once in a lifetime opportunity, Arendt volunteered to go to Jerusalem and serve
as a trial reporter for The New Yorker magazine. She felt she owed it to herself, not just
because of her professional commitment to understanding the totalitarian phenomenon,
but also to find closure in her personal life, for her own experiences that still weighed
heavy on her mind, even after so many years. Not since Rahel Varnhagen had Arendt
committed so much of herself to a project. She wanted to know what made Eichmann do
the things he did without remorse. If she could get inside his head, then she could begin
to understand the complete “moral collapse” of European society that allowed for the
destruction of six million Jews. After the trial was over—with Eichmann being convicted
and executed—Arendt’s reports appeared in The New Yorker, and within a few months
she published them collectively under the title Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
Banality of Evil (1963). Arendt claimed, contrary to the belief of many others who saw
the trial, that Eichmann was not a monster or demon, or even a sadistic killer, but instead
an average individual who simply lost the ability “to think and to judge” for himself. 1
Arendt’s argument found criticism among Jews and Gentiles alike because of her
unwillingness to demonize Eichmann and her outspoken opinion that Jewish Councils
aided Eichmann in his deportations. She was labeled as a “self-hating Jewess” and an
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Eichmann sympathizer who condemned Jews and exonerated Nazis.2 In the universities
a debate raged over the validity of Arendt’s argument, and her reputation became tied to
her newfound notion of the banality of evil. To understand what Arendt meant by the
banality of evil, and Eichmann’s loss of thought and judgment, we have to look at her
final writings on The Life of Mind (1978), where she fully elucidates exactly what she
means by “thinking” and “judging.”
In The Human Condition, Between Past and Future, and On Revolution Arendt
made her case for human plurality on the basis of action and freedom. Yet, with the
Eichmann trial, it became apparent that her task was not complete. So much of the
philosophical tradition depended on notions of thought and truth. How could she
characterize Eichmann as un-thinking when thinking itself was open to so much
interpretation? From Plato and Aristotle, to Kant and Hegel, and into the twentieth
century, the faculties of the mind were defined and redefined with each new thinker.
Arendt had to say, this is what I mean by thinking; this is what I mean by judging. Only
then would her arguments not just about Eichmann, but about totalitarianism, action,
freedom, individuality, and human plurality—indeed her entire system of thought—reach
their full potency.
Arendt did not avoid such an argument altogether in her earlier writing, although
she concerned herself much more with the political implications of such thinking. In the
1945 essay “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” Arendt hints at the idea of
banality in the SS ranks.3 Then, in 1953 she wrote about “Understanding and Politics,”4
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followed several years later by the essay “Truth and Politics”5 in the expanded 1968
edition of Between Past and Future. Ronald Beiner argues, however, that with the 1971
essay, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,”6 Arendt began to move away from
examining the political implications of judgment, and instead concerned herself with
judgment as a faculty of the mind, in connection with other mental abilities. “From that
essay onward, judgment is considered from the point of view of the life of the mind.”7
With The Life of the Mind Arendt wanted to provide a complete account of all the
faculties of the mind. She divided her project into three volumes.8 Part one focuses on
the faculty of thinking, its role in traditional philosophy, and its limitations discovered by
Kant. Part two is much more a history of ideas, in which Arendt discusses the different
ideas about the faculty of willing throughout the philosophical tradition, although Arendt
prefers not think of the will as an idea in the proper sense (i.e. something created in the
mind), but instead as a condition of the mind that has always existed, whether recognized
or not. Part three, intended to cover the faculty of judgment, was never written. Arendt
died in 1975, at the age of 69, shortly after finishing her volume on “Willing.” However,
prior to her death, she did not remain silent about her intended arguments in “Judging.”
In fact, she lectured extensively on the topic in 1970 at the New School for Social
Research. Although known to Arendtian scholars, the lectures were not published until
1992 under the title Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. The lectures centered on
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Kant’s final critique, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, which Arendt believed to be
Kant’s most political writing.9 Similarly, Arendt’s volume on thinking mirrored Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason, and her volume on willing, his Critique of Practical Reason.
Indeed, it was always Arendt’s intention to create The Life of the Mind as a parallel to
Kant’s three Critiques. Kant weighs heavily on Arendt’s argument in “Thinking,” and
according to her, his third critique offers the most comprehensive view of judgment in the
entire philosophical tradition. Surprisingly, though Kant is present in Arendt’s volume
on “Willing,” he is not the centerpiece. Arendt turns the focus away from Kant because
she argues that he subsumes willing (practical reason)10 to the dictates of pure reason.
Quoting another Kantian scholar Arendt affirms the argument that Kant’s moral
philosophy rested on the assumption that ‘pure reason can be practical.’11 Arendt, on the
other hand argues that the three primary mental activities—thinking, willing, and
judging—are interdependent. One cannot dominate over the others, and they cannot be
derived from each other, or reduced to a common denominator.12 Thus, with The Life of
the Mind Arendt did not just regurgitate Kant’s ideas, but instead created a back-andforth dialogue with him, in which she, although owing much to Kant, does not hesitate to
openly criticize him and assert her own point of view when necessary.
Kant played a major role in Arendt’s thinking from a young age. By age sixteen
she had read his Critiques, which helped her decide to make philosophy the center of her
life’s ambition. Yet even in her early writing Arendt remains suspicious of Kant’s
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rationalism. Thus, while The Life of the Mind offers new insights into Kant, Arendt also
uses it to restate many of the criticisms found in her earlier works. As early as The
Human Condition she rejects the philosophical tradition (Kant included) for its
contemptus mundi, contempt for the world. She even wanted to give The Human
Condition the title amor mundi, love of the world, to contrast it with the former.13 Going
back even further, Arendt gets the idea for “radical evil,” which she uses in The Origins
of Totalitarianism, from Kant himself. Yet even then she was critical of him for trying to
rationalize his concept in order to fit his overall moral philosophy.14
Still, there is little doubt that Arendt admired Kant’s Critiques for his method as
much as his ideas. In her Lectures she discusses the idea of critical thinking, and why the
three Critiques were indeed exercises in critical thought. For Kant, critical thinking was
synonymous with enlightenment. He even called the Age of Enlightenment “the age of
criticism,” adding, “...to such criticism everything must submit… [and] sustain the test of
free and open examination.”15 Critical thinking is equally opposed to skepticism as it is
to dogmatism. As Arendt explains, the dogmatist believes he holds the one real truth,
while the skeptic insists that no truth exists at all. “The critical position stands between
them both.” Critical thinking argues that perhaps we can have a notion of truth, but in
our limited capacities never be able to actually possess it. For Arendt, “The result of such
criticism is Selbstdenken, to ‘use your own mind.’”16 To understand Arendt’s point of
view on Selbstdenken, we have to go back to her thoughts on Lessing.
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In Rahel Varnhagen Arendt was extremely critical of the salon society’s adoption
of Lessing’s term. She wrote they used it to “bring liberation from objects and their
reality,” to create “a sphere of pure ideas.” According to traditional metaphysics, truth
remains universally valid insofar as it remains within the realm of ideas, but once it hits
reality it is subject to experience. Additionally, the self, once it becomes an object of
consciousness, ultimately rebounds upon itself. Self-thinking, then if it wishes to remains
true, has to become introspection, for which Arendt had nothing positive to say.17 For
romantic introspection, the individuality of the self was indeed compatible with the
universality of pure reason, leaving reality and, to Arendt’s disgust, human plurality out
of the equation altogether. In introspection, Selbstdenken becomes akin to thinking about
oneself, rather than the Kantian pronouncement “to think for oneself.” Arendt believes
that Kant was much closer to Lessing’s original intention. Included at the beginning of
Men in Dark Times (1968) is a speech entitled “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts
on Lessing,”18 which Arendt gave upon accepting the Lessing Prize awarded to her by the
free city of Hamburg. In her speech, she identifies Lessing’s Selbstdenken as
“independent thinking for oneself,” which “is by no means an activity pertaining to a
closed, integrated, organically grown, and cultivated individual.” She continues, “For
Lessing thought does not arise out of the individual and is not the manifestation of a
self.”19 Here Arendt clearly refutes the Romantic view of self-thinking. Lessing, like
Kant, did not believe in a single absolute truth. He thought that all truth should be
subject to critical interpretation. Lessing “rejoiced…that the truth, as soon as it is uttered,
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is immediately transformed into one opinion among many, is contested, reformulated,
reduced to one subject of discourse among others.”20 So we have come full circle back to
the idea of critical thinking, but critical thinking is not thinking as such. In order to
distinguish between the two, one must first of all know what constitutes thinking as such.
Kant sought to answer this question in his Critique of Pure Reason, and so in turn did
Arendt in “Thinking,” the first volume of The Life of the Mind.
Thinking
With his critique Kant set out to find the limits of pure reason. As Arendt
suggests, in doing so Kant addressed one of the three basic questions he believed drove
all philosophy: What can I know? The other two being: What ought I to do? and What
may I hope?21 After subjecting pure reason to critical thinking, Kant came to the
conclusion that a rift exists between reason (Vernuft) and intellect (Verstand).22 Kant
discovered what he called the “scandal of reason,” which is the fact that our mind is
capable of conceiving things about which we can never obtain certain and verifiable
knowledge. Nevertheless, we cannot help but think about them. Following Kant, Arendt
lists these unknowables as 1) the freedom of the will; 2) the immortality of the soul; 3)
the existence of God.23 These “ultimate questions” give us an “urgent need” to reason,
which different from and “more than [the] mere quest and desire for knowledge.”24 Thus
Arendt concludes,
[T]he distinguishing of the two faculties, reason and intellect, coincides
with the distinction between two altogether different mental activities,
20
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thinking and knowing, and two altogether different concerns, meaning in
the first category, and cognition, in the second…if it is true that thinking
and reason are justified in transcending the limitations of cognition and
intellect—justified by Kant on the ground that the matters they deal with,
though unknowable, are of the greatest existential interest to man—then
the assumption must be that thinking and reason are not concerned with
what the intellect is concerned with. To anticipate, and to put in a
nutshell: The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but the
quest for meaning. Truth and meaning are not the same. The basic
fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to
interpret meaning on the model of truth. (emp. in text)25
Reason, which Arendt also calls the faculty of speculative thought,26 while still
imperative to philosophy, does not produce truth; it is only capable of producing
meaning. Cognition, on the other hand, does produce truth, but not meaning. She
explains,
The distinction, on its most elementary level, and in Kant’s own words,
lies in the fact that “concepts of reason serve us to conceive (begreifen,
comprehend) as concepts of the intellect serve us to apprehend
perceptions”… In other words, the intellect (Verstand) desires to grasp
what is given to the senses, reason wishes to understand its meaning.
Cognition, whose highest criterion is truth, derives that criterion for the
world of appearances in which we take our bearings through sense
perceptions, whose testimony is self-evident, that is, unshakable by
argument and replaceable only by other evidence. As the German
translation of the Latin perceptio, the word Wahrnehmung used by Kant
(what is given me in perceptions and ought to be true [Wahr]) clearly
indicates truth is located in the evidence of the senses. But that is by no
means the case with meaning and with the faculty of thought, which
searches for it; the latter does not ask what something is or whether it
exists at all—its existence is always taken for granted—but what it means
for it to be. This distinction between truth and meaning seems to me to be
not only decisive for any inquiry into the nature of human thinking but
also to be the necessary consequence of Kant’s crucial distinction between
reason and intellect.27
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With this argument Arendt reveals that her notion of thinking as such is derived directly
from Kant. While she did not draw all the same conclusion as Kant, her debt to him is
undeniable.
In one section of “Thinking” Arendt tackles the “old metaphysical dichotomy of
(true) Being and (mere) appearances;” what she calls the “two-world theory.”28 It is a
hierarchical idea, that in order to find true Being the philosopher must transcend the
world given to him. Reality can deceive and conceal truth. It can appear as nothing more
than shadows on a wall (to use Plato’s metaphor). Metaphysical thinking is essentially an
escape from this world, and an escape from the body. On this matter Kant and Arendt are
in complete agreement with Plato, Aristotle and the philosophical tradition. The key
characteristic of thinking is withdrawal.29 Arendt, in line with her existential philosophy,
denies the hierarchy that places thinking above all else, but she does not deny that
thinking itself constitutes a withdrawal from appearances. She writes, “From the
viewpoint of the thinking ego, the body is nothing but an obstacle.”30 Kant, however, did
indeed accept the old metaphysical hierarchy, and at the root of his moral philosophy
thinking (pure reason) reigns supreme. Yet, Kant’s acceptance of the tradition was not
wholesale. Plato began philosophy with the idea that truth and Being are inseparable.
Kant, as we have seen, did not ascribe to the notion of true Being. Truth, he argues,
because it claims absolute validity, is based on a principle of certainty. Metaphysics, on
the other hand, is defined precisely by its uncertainty. It never appears to us, and aside
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from thinking about it, we cannot conceive of it in any way. It stands in opposition to
reality. For this reason Kant rejects Descartes’ axiom, “I think therefore I am.” Arendt
argues that Kant is “entirely right” to say the thought ‘I am not...cannot exist; for if I am
not, it follows that I cannot become aware I am not.’ (emp. in text)31 The I-am is already
inherent in the I-think, and therefore thinking cannot produce the certainty of reality, as
Descartes hoped; it can only choose to accept it or reject it. In “What is Existential
Philosophy?” Arendt labels Kant as a forerunner to existential thought for precisely this
reason.32 Thinking cannot tell us how reality exists as knowledge can. Thinking can
only help us interpret reality and give it meaning. The only place thinking can escape
this limitation is in the metaphysical realm, where existence is no longer relevant.
Remember that the purpose of Kant’s critical thinking was to find the limits of pure
reason. Truth is forged in existence and experience, something thinking simply cannot
grasp. Kant may have kept with the traditional hierarchy of Being over appearance, but
within his philosophy Being was equated with meaning, not truth. By elevating meaning
over truth, Kant directly confronted the Platonic idea that Being and truth were one in the
same. Moses Mendelssohn called Kant the “all-destroyer” of metaphysics for doing so.33
Kant insists on ideas as “thought-things,” and not as objects as such. Objects are things
which appear in the phenomenal world. We know objects, but do not think about them.
For something to appear it must be ‘standing still and remaining’ long enough to be
recognized by a subject. Transcendent objects (thought-things or ideas) are fleeting and
never actually appear, in the proper sense, anywhere.34 What Kant is doing here is
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defining where metaphysics ends and reality begins. The metaphysical realm (the
noumenal world) cannot be known the same way we know the phenomenal world.
Metaphysical thinking then becomes a redundant term as all thinking is inherently
metaphysical.
In the introduction to “Thinking” Arendt returns to the question of Eichmann,
reiterating her characterization of him as not being evil or stupid, but “thoughtless.” She
confesses that the question “What is thinking” had occupied her mind since writing The
Human Condition, in which she contrasted the vita activa and vita contemplativa, but it
was the Eichmann trial that solidified her decision to fully investigate all her doubts about
the thinking activity. She writes, “It was this absence of thinking…that awakened my
interest.” She then asks, “Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty from telling
right and wrong, be connected with out faculty of thought?35 With this question Arendt
went looking for Eichmann’s conscience. Drawing on Kant’s distinctions between
reason and intellect, Arendt further distinguished between conscience and consciousness.
She argued that the conscience did indeed arise out of the thinking process.
Consciousness, on the other hand, was a form of cognition. She concluded, continuing
along Kantian lines, the conscience dealt in terms of meaning, and consciousness in terms
of truth.
Much of the criticism that Arendt aimed at other thinkers is drawn from the fact
that they somehow try to combine reason and intellect, thinking and knowing, or meaning
and truth. Arendt is just as critical of modern science for confusing these concepts as she
is of ancient metaphysics. She writes,
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With the rise of the modern age, thinking became chiefly the handmaiden
of science, of organized knowledge; and even though thinking then grew
extremely active, following modernity’s crucial conviction that I can know
only what I myself make, it was Mathematics, the non-empirical science
par excellence, wherein the mind appears only to play with itself, that
turned out to be the Science of sciences, delivering the key to those laws
of nature and the universe that are concealed by appearances…[I]t became
axiomatic for Descartes—during the famous night of his “revelation”—
that there existed ‘a fundamental accord between the laws of nature… and
the laws of mathematics’…And he actually believed with this kind of
thinking…he could deliver certain knowledge about the existence of God,
the nature of the soul, and similar matters.36
For Arendt, as in Kant, we have seen that such questions are of course unknowable.
Modern science, encouraged by Descartes, tried to use thinking as a means to knowing,
but for Arendt this was not possible.
Descartes is symptomatic of the modern confusion that thinking somehow
produces consciousness. In “Thinking” Arendt refers the reader back to similar
comments made in The Human Condition.37 She argues that all modern philosophy
began with Cartesian doubt, the idea that only through doubting reality in the activity of
thought can one begin to find a level of certainty. For Arendt, thinking can conceive of
reality, but its “realness…remains stubbornly out of reach.”38 In other words, thinking
has no direct, “matter-of-fact” connection to reality. She argues it was precisely
Descartes’ thought that “destroyed his common-sense trust in reality, and his error was to
hope he could overcome his doubt by insisting on withdrawing from the world altogether,
eliminating every worldly reality from his thoughts and concentrating on the thinking
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activity itself.”39 Descartes wanted something whose reality was beyond suspicion. He
found it in the “certainty of consciousness.”40 In the Human Condition Arendt writes,
“Descartes concluded that those processes which go on in the mind of man himself have
a certainty of their own, they can become the object of investigation in introspection.”41
Thinking, as Arendt continually argues, cannot become an object for itself. Introspection
tries to think about the self, which is impossible. The self is instead an object of
consciousness, of cognition. It explains to us how we exist as individuals. Thinking can
only go as far as to conceive that we do exist, but has no clue to the manner in which we
do. Our individuality is a condition of our particular existence, and as such beyond the
grasp of thinking. So, when introspection vainly tries to replace thinking with knowing,
the self becomes elevated to a primal position in the mind. It essentially takes the place
of the conscience, and in doing so creates meaning out of interaction with itself.
Meaning is no longer the product of thinking, but knowledge instead, and self-knowledge
at that. Self-consciousness, because of its ultimate certainty, becomes the measure of all
things, both seen and unseen—a proposition Arendt finds highly offensive. Selfconsciousness is then called thinking to further justify the illusion, self-thinking to be
precise, which as we have seen is a perversion of the term. Introspection elevates the role
of the individual self at the cost of both reality and thinking as such. That is why Arendt
accuses Descartes of “radical subjectivism.”42 Arendt’s accusation is also directed at
modern philosophy in general. It has already been argued that Arendt viewed mass
society not as a plurality, but as a group of “isolated individuals.” This is because
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modern philosophy elevates the individual to the point where Man, not men, inhabits the
earth. This symptom, Arendt argues, found its greatest expression in the late 18th/early
19th centuries when Enlightenment philosophers tried to justify the “abstract man” in
terms of rational thought, and Romantics asserted the individual self as the standard of all
things. Both, Arendt argues, had their origins in Descartes.
Descartes wanted to make individual thought the vehicle for universal reason.
The two were compatible in his eyes because every individual was capable of conceiving
universally valid truths. Thus, for Descartes what binds mankind together as a whole is
our individually shared capacity for reason. Arendt argues, however, that in doing so
Descartes did not conceive of mankind as a plurality but instead as a group of individuals.
Furthermore, nothing differentiated these individuals, only the fact they were equally part
of a greater whole, mankind. To compensate for the loss of the individual, Descartes
retreated into the world of self-knowledge, as we have seen. In the realm of introspection
the individual could retain subjective truths while still acknowledging rational truths that
bound him together with other individuals. For Descartes, the individual could conceive
of his existence objectively (rationally), as well as the manner in which he existed
subjectively. Thus, the individual was completely autonomous, what Dana Villa calls the
“subjectification of reality.”43 But when considered as part of mankind, he was also
completely powerless in the face of universal laws that made him simply part of a greater
whole. Arendt’s argument against Descartes’ autonomous yet powerless individual
comes from her critique of rationalism in general as elevating universals over particulars.
She is just as critical of Kant for promoting universal conceptions of mankind to endorse
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notions of perpetual progress in history.44 Dana Villa writes, “Kant escapes what he
considers to be the self-evident meaninglessness of the particular by ascending to the
level of the ‘whole.”’45 Kant, like Descartes, argued that mankind is driven by reason,
which is unchanging and universal, and as such is unaltered by the subjective interests its
individual parts. The Enlightenment concept of the “abstract man” was Descartes’
autonomous, yet powerless, individual.46 Arendt’s argument is that Descartes created an
individual/mankind dichotomy, in which each is completely autonomous within its own
sphere. There is no thought of plurality, of inter-subjectivity, and thus, there is no room
for politics as a community of men. For Arendt, Enlightenment rationalism and
Romantic introspection solidified this dichotomy as the keystone modern philosophy.
Mass society then rose as a group of isolated individuals, and not as a plurality. She
writes in a letter to Karl Jaspers, “the omnipotence of an individual man would make men
superfluous.”47 Here Arendt is clearly tying the individualistic ideas of Descartes, Kant,
and others to the development of superfluousness, and by extension totalitarianism, in
modern times.
According to Arendt, German idealists after Kant, though indebted to his ideas,
were unable to sustain his distinction between reason and intellect. They created
phenomenology as a “Science of the Experience of Consciousness,” in which speculative
44
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thought was somehow meant to bridge the gap, while at the same time keeping the
separation intact. Arendt suggests that phenomenologists began
[E]agerly blurring the distinction between reason’s concern with the
unknowable and the intellect’s concern with cognition. Pursuing the
Cartesian ideal of certainty as though Kant had never existed, they
believed in all earnest that the results of their speculations possessed the
same kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes.48
Speculative thought was again an attempt to think about reality, but through the lens of
consciousness. Phenomenology was actually the activity of thinking about consciousness
itself. The certainty of consciousness was then attributed to ideas found through
speculative reason. Instead of trying to replace thinking with knowing, speculative
reason tried to combine the two in a strange attempt to place meaning on knowledge by
thinking about it, and at the same time to place certainty on thinking by directing it
towards consciousness. For Arendt, the closest thinking can come is to have a memory
of consciousness. The only way in fact that thinking can even conceive of reality is by
remembering it. Memories are, of course, not reality but an image of reality. “Representation, making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s unique gift.”49 This
unique gift is not memory itself, but another mental activity, imagination, which uses
memory to engage the conscience. Imagination allows us to think about our memories,
giving them meaning. According to Arendt, St. Augustine was able to articulate this idea
better than any philosopher before or after him, with the exception of Kant.50
Imagination was so important to Arendt that she later returned to the subject in her
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Lectures, preparing to tackle the faculty of judgment.51 It is safe to assume that she
would have given it ample coverage if “Judging” had been written.
Willing
In the second volume of The Life of the Mind, Arendt refers to willing as the
“immediate datum of consciousness,” meaning the will uses consciousness as a basis for
action.52 Yet, willing is not synonymous with acting. Willing takes place solely within
the mind (vita contemplativa), while action takes place outside the mind (vita activa).
Arendt’s distaste for Rousseau arises out his belief that willing can somehow take the
place of action. Likewise, the will is not dependent on reason or the intellect. Arendt’s
key idea is interdependence. The will works with the other mental faculties not for them,
as Kant argued. Willing is not completely independent either. Such an argument would
be no different than the common philosophical argument that pure thinking alone can
suffice for the mind to function properly. Philosophy has a hard time incorporating the
will because by it runs counter to the supremacy of reason. She writes, “What aroused
the philosopher’s distrust in this faculty was its inevitable connection with Freedom.”53
Recall, however, Arendt’s arguments in “What is Freedom” in the previous chapter on
the differences between inner freedom, which takes place in the mind, and freedom of
action, which she equates with political freedom. For Arendt, willing alone is not
sufficient for freedom. Freedom itself is a political quality. It is achieved only through
action.
Yet, for Arendt, the will is indeed “free” in the sense that it cannot be dictated by
necessity. Quoting Augustine, Arendt argues, “If I must necessarily will, then why need I
51
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speak of will at all?” 54 As Arendt continually argued in her earlier works, freedom is
defined by something that may or may not be. If it is forced or cannot be otherwise, then
it is not free. Arendt’s anticipates this argument in “Thinking” with a discussion of
contingency versus necessity. At the center of the discussion are Leibniz’s two
categories of truth: the truth of facts and the truths of reason. The truths of fact are what
Kant would come to identify as truth itself. They are contingent upon reality and
dependent on existence. Truths of fact change based on the reality of their objects. If an
object changes its appearance, or ceases to exist, then its truths change as well. Truth of
reason, on the other hand, cannot ever change. They are closer to Arendt’s concept of
“thinking.” Because they cannot change, they are characterized by necessity. If
something is necessarily true, then it is irresistible to rational thought. “Truth [of reason]
compels with the force of necessity.” As Arendt points out, this caused Hugo Grotius to
utter the sentiment ‘even God cannot make two times two not equal four.’55 He believed
that it would always be true no matter what. Here we see a pre-cursor to Enlightenment
thought, where even God is subject to the laws of rationality. Again this was not
completely new to philosophy. Leibniz and Grotius drew from the Platonic idea that the
higher ontological order consists of things that are necessary and cannot be otherwise,
rather than things that are contingent and could different should their reality change. It is
the old philosophical hierarchy of true Being over mere appearances, which we have
already discussed.
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The will, because it is free and deals with contingent existence, cannot be
conceived of in terms of rational truth (truths of reason).56 That is why only a select few
philosophers (Arendt uses St. Augustine and Duns Scotus as her examples) actually
conceived of a free will that is not under the dictates of thought.57 Thought is
characterized by its uncertainty, its distance from knowledge. A common mistake among
philosophers was to assume that because willing uses the objects of consciousness, it too
is characterized by certainty. However, such is not the case. Willing is, in fact, just as
uncertain as thinking. This is so because willing directs itself towards the future, using
conscious objects as a guide for the possibility of potential objects. Arendt argues that
the will “is as obviously our mental organ for the future as memory is our mental organ
for the past. The moment we turn our mind to the future, we are no longer concerned with
‘objects’ but projects (emp. in text).”58 Projects cannot be known is the same way
objects can, and are thus subject to uncertainty. Thinking and willing come into conflict
over the ancient distinction between necessity and contingency. Thinking, though
uncertain of reality, carries with it an illusion of necessity, because the “truths of reason”
are undeniable to rational thought. Also, in examining the re-presentations of memory,
thinking finds that the past cannot be changed, cannot be otherwise, and is in a sense
necessary.59 Willing, on the other hand, is equally as uncertain, but cannot possibly
assume necessity for projects, because unlike the past, which already has been, the future
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is always open to change. Free action, which springs from a free will, is by its nature
contingent. Arendt writes, “There is hardly anything more contingent than willed acts
which—on the assumption of free will—could all be defined as acts about which I know
that I could as well have left them undone.”60
Kant spent a great deal of effort dealing with the faculty of the will because, like
most philosophers, he found it very hard to reconcile its inherent freedom and spontaneity
with the necessity of rational truth. His response to this divide was the formulation of his
categorical imperative, through which he tried to create a bridge between necessity and
contingency, between morality and freedom. Kant first created the imperative in his
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, and he restates it in the Critique of Practical
Reason as “Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always be thought of as
being, at the same time, a principle underlying universal legislation.”61 Crucial to Kant’s
imperative is the distinction between subjective maxims, valid only for the will of the
individual, and objective principles/practical laws, that are valid for the will of every
rational being.62 Thus, the categorical imperative argues that the individual should
subjectively will that which could at the same time be willed by all rational beings.
Because the categorical imperative engages both subjectivity and objectivity at the same
time, it also engages both truth and meaning. Truth, because it can achieve objective
knowledge, relates us to the objects of our action. By doing so it provides an objective
reality, subject to universal laws, in which we can act. Without this reality, meaning
remains subjective in the sense that it “exists” (though it cannot exist in the proper sense)
60
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only in the mind of the individual, and as such can only provide maxims. Still, for Kant
meaning is given supremacy because it essentially tells us how to act. Without meaning
our actions, though based in reality and applicable to universal laws, are unguided by
morality. They become simple means-end operations.63 Thus, Kant conceives of
morality in terms of meaning, but in order to will morality, rather than just thinking about
it, we need to be able to apply meaning to the truths found through cognition and
knowledge. In other words, Kant uses the categorical imperative as the practical
application of pure reason. Kant even uses the term “pure practical reason” to explain his
argument. He explicitly calls the categorical imperative ‘The Fundamental Law Issuing
in Pure Practical Reason.”64 In his Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason Kant
states that one of his goals is “to establish the fact that there is such a thing as pure
practical reason.”65 He argues that although ideas cannot have an objective reality
outside the world of appearances, “it was still possible to grant this reality to them in
application to the objects of pure practical reason.”66 Kant is quick to point out,
however, that objective reality cannot by any means exert the kind of determinism on
pure ideas that it does on truth. Kant reiterates the distinction between reason and
intellect, between meaning and truth, because another of his goals in the Critique of
Practical Reason is to place the categorical imperative within the context of his findings
in the Critique of Pure Reason, and not in contradiction to them. Pure practical reason,
63
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although it is willed, must also subject itself to the rules of pure thinking. In “Willing”
Arendt argues that Kant conceives of the will in two ways. 67 The first is a completely
free will that is both spontaneous and autonomous; it begins something entirely new with
each new act. For Kant, this could in no way produce morality, and so he does little to
reconcile it with his overall moral philosophy. Kant even speaks of the embarrassment of
“speculative reason in dealing with the question of the freedom of the will.”68 To fix this
problem Kant conceived of the will in terms of practical reason, which can be used by
pure reason to create pure practical reason. Pure practical reason receives its law from
the categorical imperative, “which tells the will what to do and adds: Don’t make an
exception for yourself, obey the axiom of non-contradiction, which, since Socrates, has
ruled the soundless dialogue of thought.”69 For Kant, the will could be free and moral at
the same time if used in accordance with the categorical imperative.70 Kant formulated
his philosophy is such a way because it enabled him to answer another of his three basic
questions for philosophy: What ought I to do?
Arendt argues that Kant’s conception of pure practical reason and his equation of
freedom and morality led later philosophers to substitute willing for reason as man’s
highest mental faculty. She writes, “After Kant it became fashionable to equate Willing
and Being.”71 She attacks German idealists, beginning with Hegel, for blurring Kant’s
distinction between reason and intellect. Because they tried to “think” about
consciousness, they imposed the necessity of thinking onto the contingency of willing,
giving birth the modern concept of history. According to Arendt, “No philosopher has
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described the thinking ego in its clash with the willing ego with greater sympathy,
insight, and consequence for the history of thought than Hegel.”72 Hegel’s understanding
of history began with a dialectical understanding of the present and the future. He writes,
“The future is directly within the present, for it is contained as its negative fact.”73
Through this dialectical process Hegel finds meaning, which along Kantian lines, he
equates with Being. In other words, Being reveals itself in the instance when the future
negates the present, but then manifests itself in reality once again in the new present, and
the process starts over again. From this idea Hegel arrives at the notion of infinite
progress, which is inherent in his concept of history. The philosopher’s job is to look at
history as the result of previous present/future dialectics and find the manifestations of
Being within. Hegel’s world spirit is simply the ways in which Being manifested itself in
history.74 Because Hegel wanted to emphasize progress he insisted on the primacy of the
future over the past. Yet, Hegel’s future was anything but contingent and uncertain.
Using his dialectic, Hegel sees the future as another potential present to be supplanted,
and thus as another potential past as well, “when the immediate I-shall-be will have
become an I-shall-have-been. In this schema the past is produced by the future, and
thinking, which contemplates the past, is the result of the Will.”75 Hegel identifies the
will as the source of freedom, but because he uses it as part of his dialectic of infinite
progress, freedom then comes as a result of necessity.76 Willing, though it deals with
action more than any of the other mental faculties, does not deal directly with the
conscience. According to Arendt, simply by willing an action we cannot tell whether it is
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right or wrong, only that we willed to do so. Thus, Eichmann’s lack of conscience was
not a crisis of willing.
Judging
In “Thinking” and “Willing” Arendt uses most of her argument to criticize other
thinkers for misplacing or misunderstanding the faculties of the mind, causing them to
draw false conclusions. Of all things, she makes the least effort towards defining
conscience, even though this seemed to be her primary goal, in light of Eichmann’s lack
of one. The only thing she explains is that we cannot arrive at the conscience through
self-consciousness. It is a product of thinking because it deals in matters of meaning, not
truth. Conscience is definitely not the self, but neither is it sheer thinking. Arendt
repeatedly asserted that thinking as such seeks to withdraw from the world. If conscience
withdraws from the world, then how could it tell us what is right and what is wrong in
this world? In the end Arendt left the notion of conscience largely unexplored because
she so closely ties it to her third and final faculty of the mind: judging. In writing
“Thinking” and “Willing” she must have anticipated that conscience would be her
primary concern in “Judging,” so she saved most of argument from the first two volumes.
In “Judging” she would have finally been ready to bring her arguments about Eichmann
to a close. From the beginning she accused Eichmann of losing the ability “to think and
to judge.” For Arendt, the loss of thought and judgment go hand-in-hand because of their
mutual connection to the conscience. Although “Judging” could not be written, with
Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy and a few hints in The Life of the Mind,
a clear picture of her concept of judging, as well as conscience, does emerge.
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Although Arendt accused Eichmann of the inability to think, she did so in
connection with judging. The distinctions Arendt draws in “Thinking” between thinking
and knowing are not meant to be directed at Eichmann, but instead at philosophy itself,
both ancient and modern. Of course Eichmann was affected by trends in modern
philosophy, just as any other person living in the twentieth century, but to say that
Arendt’s disgust at Eichmann resulted from his misinterpretation of the concept of
thought is simply ridiculous. Arendt would have been hard-pressed to find anyone
calling Eichmann a philosopher. So, Arendt’s focus for interpreting Eichmann is found
in her ideas on judging, and how it works with thinking to tell right from wrong.
The first hint of judging comes in “Thinking” when Arendt discusses what she
calls “common-sense reasoning.”77 She writes,
The reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which
includes others who perceive as I do, on the one hand, and by the working
together of my five senses on the other. What since Thomas Aquinas we
call common sense, the sensus communis, is a kind of sixth sense needed
to keep my five senses together and guarantee that it is the same object
that I see, touch, taste, smell, and hear; it is the ‘one faculty [that] extends
to all objects of the five senses.’ This same sense, a mysterious ‘sixth
sense’ because it cannot be localized in a bodily organ, fits the sensations
of my strictly private five senses…into a common world shared by others.
The subjectivity of the it-seems-to-me is remedied by the fact that the
same object appears to others, though its mode of appearance may be
different. It is the inter-subjectivity of the world, rather than similarity of
physical appearance, that convinces men that they belong to the same
species. Though each single object appears in a different perspective to
each individual, the context in which it appears is the same for the whole
species.78
Arendt’s words here are important for several reasons. First of all, with phrases like
“common world shared by others” and “inter-subjectivity” she is clearly arguing that
common sense works with human plurality, not against it. Thus, it is not surprising that
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she find it favorable to political action. Second, Arendt is sure to point out that common
sense is not thinking. She argues that it may be tempting to equate the two because
common sense does not appear as the other senses do, and thus seems invisible like
thought. But common sense helps “guarantee” reality, and in doing so remains in this
world, as thinking does not.79 Finally, along similar lines, Arendt argues that common
sense is indeed a “sense,” and thus its purpose is to perceive objects. What common
sense can perceive that no other sense can is the sheer thereness of an object, its reality or
“realness.”80 “Thinking can neither prove nor destroy the feeling of realness arising out
of the sixth sense;” an error we have seen that Descartes did not avoid.81
According to Arendt, philosophy traditionally tied the notion of conscience
exclusively to thought. Reason or revelation (depending on the philosopher) used the
thinking process to inform conscience of right and wrong. Arendt does not necessarily
deviate from this position either, as she still argues conscience comes through meaning, a
product of thinking. What traditional philosophy tried to do was extend the conscience
into reality by way of thinking. Conscience did not just give the meaning of right and
wrong, but was also able to say this particular object or event is right or wrong. It did
not seem odd to traditional philosophy that conscience could be a sense, based in reality,
and at the same time completely subsumed under the dictates of thought. Arendt quotes
the term “silent sense” traditionally used for conscience to show that philosophy equated
conscience with common sense.82 Traditional philosophy was apt to confuse conscience
and common sense precisely because it confused thinking and knowing, meaning and
79
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truth. Arendt argues, however, that common sense is not conscience, because common
sense actually cares little for meaning. “Questions of meaning are unanswerable by
common sense,” because its function is to recognize objects in this world.83 Commonsense reasoning and common sense experience do more to answer the questions of
knowing. Common sense helps us know that the particular objects of our senses are
indeed real; it perceives their reality.
Arendt argues that even Kant, despite his ideas on meaning and truth, desperately
tried to fit conscience into the traditional mold because of the metaphysical hierarchy that
made pure thought the highest ontological category. Kant tried to make conscience
dictate right and wrong to reality, but his separation of meaning and truth kept him from
asserting the reality of conscience. Just as the categorical imperative cannot become an
object of cognition, neither can the conscience. In his Critique of Practical Reason Kant
calls the conscience “a faculty to be met within ourselves,”84 while also referring to the
categorical imperative as “the moral law within ourselves.”85 Conscience is then the
mental manifestation of the categorical imperative, making it synonymous with Kant’s
notion of a “thing-in-itself:” something that appears to the mind but cannot appear to the
senses. Because conscience cannot appear to the senses, it can have no common-sense
reality. According to Arendt, Kant was then forced to create the concept of judgment,
acting as a mediator between conscience and reality. Judgment could in no way create
meaning, but it could examine meaning to say of reality: this (object, not idea) is right or
wrong, or even this is beautiful or ugly.86 In traditional philosophy conscience did this by
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itself. The mutual concern with particular objects makes judgment and common sense
very closely related. Judgment and common sense are so close in fact that Kant tried to
hypothesize “Taste [Judgment] as a kind of sensus communis,” but Arendt does not want
to equate the two. 87 She argues that common sense can only perceive an object as real; it
cannot relate an object to meaning as judging can. Kant tried to equate the two because
he argued, “[U]nder the sensus communis we must include the idea of sense common to
all, i.e., [the idea] of a faculty of judgment.”88 From here Kant begins to direct his
attention towards human plurality. In Arendt’s eyes, he was one of only a few
philosophers ever to do so, which explains her admiration for him.
Speaking of a sense common to all, Kant insists on the communicability of
judgment. People cannot force others to accept their judgments; all they can do is
persuade them. No one can definitively say one thing is more beautiful than another, but
they can make an argument to be heard by others. Thus, judgments must be spoken.89
Thinking back to the previous chapter, recall that one of Arendt’s most basic ideas is that
speech maintains the public realm. Speech is the most political of all actions. Arendt
sees judgment as the most political faculty of the mind for such reasons.90 Thinking is
only made political in its relationship to judging. Based on this argument, Arendt asserts
that Kant’s political philosophy was more apparent in his Critique of Judgment than his
Critique of Practical Reason.91
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Kant’s moral philosophy still influenced his political philosophy. Where that
influence becomes apparent is precisely where Arendt’s own thoughts begin to deviate
from Kant. The first clue is Kant’s distinction between “the principle according to which
you should act and the principle according to which you judge.”92 Arendt would make no
such distinction. According to Arendt, Kant’s separation of the two created a conflict
between morality and politics. Kant’s solution to this conflict is his categorical
imperative, and it is how he re-asserts the supremacy of reason.93 Morality deals in terms
of universals, and politics in terms of particulars. The categorical imperative uses the
particulars given to it to act on the universality of reason (morality). Morality in essence
tells the imperative what to do. For Kant, “the question of the right and wrong is to be
decided by neither taste nor judgment but by reason alone.”94 Arendt argues that
judgment is not a product of thinking, because it perceives reality in a way thinking
cannot. Yet, to justify his categorical imperative, Kant speaks of moral judgments.
“These, according to Kant, are necessary; they are dictated by practical reason. They
might be communicated, but this communication is secondary, even if they could not be
communicated they would remain valid.”95 Moral judgments come strikingly close to the
autonomy of the conscience in traditional philosophy. As we have seen, Kant was never
able to abandon the metaphysical hierarchy of Being over appearance, necessity over
contingency, universals over particulars. Arendt writes,
For judgment of the particular…has no place in Kant’s moral philosophy.
Judgment is not practical reason; practical reason ‘reasons’ and tells me
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what to do and what not to do; it lays down the law and is identical with
the will, and the will utters commands; it speaks in imperatives.96
The categorical imperative does not judge particulars; it acts on them by way of the will.
Thus, Kant makes the distinction between the principle on which we act on the one hand
and the principle on which we judge on the other. Morality, and by extension pure
reason, is the principle for action. For Kant, judging things as right or wrong does not
necessarily prompt action, but if we do choose to act, then it is not our judgment but our
reason that guides us. Kant’s arguments become apparent in his cry for the public use of
one’s reason, not the public use of one’s judgment, as Arendt would argue. Arendt
insists Kant “unequivocally and consistently throughout his work” argues that political
freedom is the public use of one’s reason. 97 Arendt, on the other hard, sees this as
contradictory because of reason’s necessity. To use it publicly does not mean to persuade
others, but instead to force them, because if they are reasonable (i.e. rational thinkers)
they cannot possibly decide otherwise. For Arendt, this is not freedom.
The fact that Kant conceives of freedom in terms of a free public does at least
give Arendt hope. By engaging the idea of a public in his concept of freedom, Kant
endorses the idea that humans exist in a plurality. A key part of Kant’s notion of
Selbstdenken is to think with an “enlarged mentality.” Thinking with an enlarged
mentality means taking on the viewpoint of others. In doing so, we can obtain
impartiality, which is crucial for judging.98 Impartiality is important to both Kant and
Arendt because they conceive of the judge as a spectator. The spectator presupposes
plurality because in order for there to be a spectator there has to be an actor that is being
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viewed. The spectator judges that actor. The more often we become a spectator the more
we “enlarge” our mind.99 Where Arendt and Kant differ again goes back to Kant’s
insistence on the primacy of the universal over the particular. Kant takes the plurality of
the spectator/actor relationship and pushes it further to assume the possibility of a “world
spectator.”100 For Kant, plurality assumes a particular community of people, but he also
speaks of “world community” that is naturally universal because it includes all men.101
In doing so Kant subsumes human plurality to a concept of mankind. Mankind is a
universal whole, accessible to the thoughts of pure reason. Kant uses the concept of
mankind to assert his belief in progress. Progress disregards the particular and directs it
attention at the whole, the universal. For Kant, the whole is indeed greater than the sum
of its parts. The particular is dependent on the universal. Kant relates this back to
judging because it is the function of judging to take concepts of the universal and apply
them to the particular object. As Arendt points out, the judgment, this is a table, implies
it is particularly this object, while at the same time implying it fits into the universal
category of table. Kant always assumed that the universal was superior to the particular
where Arendt did not. Thus, at the center of Kant’s concept of history stood the idea of
perpetual progress of mankind as a whole. The individual has no place in the idea of
mankind. The individual is only part of whole, and thus is not an individual in the sense
of being uniquely seen by others. According to Arendt, Kant “understood that the subject
of History’s action would have to be Mankind, rather than man or any other verifiable
human community.”102 With this thinking Kant paved the way for Hegel’s concept of a
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world spirit in history.103 In the end, Arendt finds Kant to be an eccentric thinker who
managed to include both the concept of men in the plural and mankind as a whole in his
theory of judgment. In addition, Kant is able to make man as an individual the center of
his moral philosophy.104
In her Lectures Arendt mentions Kant’s idea that a man can lose his sense of
judgment and still function logically.105 This notion is very revealing in light of the fact
that Eichmann did indeed lose his ability to judge, but never the ability to act competently
in his job. In fact, the ability to continually perform his functions as a bureaucrat,
without thinking about or judging the consequences, is precisely what made Eichmann
such an interesting case. Eichmann’s lack of judgment led Arendt to ask herself exactly
what kind of conscience he did possess. Arendt writes, “he remembered perfectly well
that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been
ordered to do—to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with great
zeal and the most meticulous care.”106 Arendt continually asserts that meaning creates
conscience. So, for Eichmann to say that he would upset his conscience by failing to
obey suggests that for him obedience carried the highest meaning. In another instance
Eichmann referred to himself as an “idealist.” An idealist, in his mind, was a man who
lived for an idea, which Arendt concluded Eichmann meant to be a man “who was
prepared to sacrifice for his idea everything and, especially, everybody.” 107 By Arendt’s
argument, Eichmann was ready to sacrifice all the Jews in Europe to save his idea of
obedience. Once Eichmann made this conviction nothing else had any meaning. He
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stopped thinking altogether, not just because all he wanted was to obey, but also because
he no longer felt the need to give meaning to anything else. Thus, Arendt concludes, all
Eichmann could “think” about was obedience. In a discussion of the Einsatzgruppen
(S.S. killing squads) Arendt argues that the soldiers, if they thought like Eichmann,
would not say “What horrible things I did to people!” but instead “What horrible things I
had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed upon my
shoulders!”108 And in fact many members of S.S., Eichmann included, used this
justification for their actions. Once Eichmann stopped thinking, he lost the ability to
judge as well. The only judgment he could render was towards himself. Did I obey this
order? Everything else was subsumed to this single judgment. Death and destruction
were an unfortunate side-effect that meant he did his job. Arendt also argues that
Eichmann’s conscience was reinforced by the fact that others around him felt the same
way. “His conscience was indeed set at rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with
which ‘good society’ everywhere reacted as he did.”109 While on trial Eichmann
continually argued that he could find no one who was actually against the Final
Solution.110 The conscience, though affected by others, is an individual organ. The
prosecution’s case against Eichmann depended on the fact he never exercised his
individual conscience. That is why he is still thought of as a murderer to this day. In
looking for Eichmann’s individual conscience Arendt found that he had an initial repulse
to the violence and death of the Final Solution, but it did not take long for him to come to
terms with it when faced with the proposition of having to disobey orders. She writes,
“[Y]es, he had a conscience, and his conscience functioned in the expected way for about
108
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four weeks, whereupon it began to function the other way around.”111 Eichmann’s
conscience was so warped by the need to obey that when Germany began to fall to its
enemies, and other Nazi officials began to abandon the Final Solution, Eichmann refused
to stop acting out his orders.112 So the banality of evil apparent in Eichmann’s actions
was how easily he stopped judging once his conscience no longer functioned. In short,
the banality of evil is “the abstention from judgment,” when “the self will surrender to the
forces of evil rather than exercise autonomous judgment.”113
During his examination by Israeli police, however, Eichmann “declared with great
emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and
especially according to a Kantian definition of duty.” Arendt responded by calling
Eichmann’s claim “outrageous,” arguing that blind obedience is incompatible with
Kant’s moral philosophy.114 During the trial one of the judges decided to further press
Eichmann on his invocation of Kant. Eichmann responded by reciting the categorical
imperative, that he acted as though the principle of his will could be the principle of
general laws. Eichmann acted on his will to obey, and he thought, surely if anything,
obedience should be the principle of law. The very notion of law entails obedience. Kant
understood this and asked with the categorical imperative that the individual go beyond
the mere obedience entailed in the law. He wanted individuals to be able to identify their
own will with the will that initiated the law, as if when they acted they were initiating the
law themselves. Eichmann severely misunderstood this point, because his only will was
to obey the will of his superiors, especially the will of the Führer. For every action
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Eichmann knew that his will was synonymous with the will that initiated the law, because
he had already subjugated his will to that of the Führer’s. Eichmann tried to argue that he
stopped using the categorical imperative once he began to work on the Final Solution, but
Arendt accuses him of distorting it instead. According to Arendt, Eichmann used “the
categorical imperative of the Third Reich,” which meant to “act in such a way that the
Führer, if he knew your actions, would approve it.”115 Eichmann had no will of his own,
so he was incapable of practical reason, which for Kant was the source of law. Without
practical reason Kant’s categorical imperative is not only useless, but potentially deadly.
Eichmann tried to exercise judgment but failed miserably because he was unable to let go
of his need to obey, which then allowed him to send millions of men, women, and
children to their deaths with a clear conscience.

115

Ibid., 136. Hans Frank, a top Nazi official, created the term and its definition.

132

CONCLUSION

Hannah Arendt writes in The Human Condition,
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and order
has in fact so much to recommend it that the greater part of political
philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as various attempts to
find theoretical foundations and practical ways for an escape from politics
all together.1
In modern times this escape from politics found new justification in the rational
individualism of the Enlightenment and the emphasis on the introspective self in
romanticism. Through her study of Jewish history, totalitarianism, and the French
Revolution Arendt came to realize the massive impact that these twin concepts had on
European politics. She proposes her notion of human plurality as an antagonist to such
thinking in the hope that later scholars could use it to promote genuine political action
worldwide. So the question remains: To what extent has she influenced the next
generation of thinkers?
Dana Villa suggests that three different schools of thought draw on Arendt’s
concepts of action and politics. First are the participatory democrats, who, like Arendt,
eschew “liberalism’s predominantly instrumental conception of politics.”2 Just like
Arendt, they believe that politics exists for its own sake, and should not be thought of as a
means to any greater notions of social justice.3 Second are the communitarians, who
argue that “the self is not and cannot be a premise of politics.”4 Selfhood, in fact, is
attained only in a shared space of common appearance, or in other words, a community.
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“Citizens must be bound together by more than a desire for mutual benefit.”5 A political
community alone can unite them as citizens.
The final school of thought that draws on Arendt’s influence is Critical Theory.
Much more so than the other two schools, the relationship between Arendt and Critical
Theory is an unusual one. By far the most prominent of the three schools, Critical
Theory began with Arendt’s contemporaries at the Institute for Social Research, also
known as the Frankfurt School.6 Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse,
and Erich Fromm—all influential thinkers in their own right—came together with their
Frankfurt School colleagues to create a new tradition of political and social thought.
Dealing with many of the same issues coming to light during the first half of the
twentieth century, Arendt and the Frankfurt School characterized the modern world in
similar ways, which is why many later critical theorists include Arendt among their
influences. Villa summarizes their common argument: “As ever-larger areas of social
existence are subjected to the dictates of instrumental reason and to the prerogatives of
rational administration, the space left for the exercise of citizenship gradually
disappears.”7 Just as Arendt speaks of the dangers of cultural assimilation and mass
society, so to do Horkheimer and Adorno speak of a “culture industry” and “mass
deception” in their Dialectic of Enlightenment.8 Like Arendt, members of the Frankfurt
School attacked the primacy of rational thought established by Cartesian doubt.9
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Yet, for all their similarities, Arendt found many ideas coming from the Frankfurt
School detestable. Likewise, her reluctance to accept some of the core ideas developing
in Critical Theory, and the fact that she was not a member of the School itself, caused
several members to cast her off as an outsider and marginalize her ideas. More than just
philosophically, Arendt clashed with the Frankfurt School on a personal level as well.
Many of the School’s members were Jewish, and thus experienced many of same things
she did during the Third Reich. Arendt found many of their personal responses to
totalitarianism and anti-Semitism to be offensive, particularly Theodor Adorno, whom
Arendt despised.10 In a letter to Karl Jaspers, in which she asks if the Jews would have
gone along with Hitler if he allowed them to, she writes “Adorno certainly would
have…he even tried on the basis of his being only half Jewish, but he couldn’t pull it
off.”11 In another letter, she suggests the possibility that “the Adorno camp” was behind
an attack in a German newspaper on her former teacher, Martin Heidegger.12 She
furthers her accusation when personal attacks continued to come at Heidegger in his old
age. She writes,
I’m quite convinced that the real people behind the scenes are the
Wiesengrund-Adorno13 crowd in Frankfurt. And that is grotesque, all the
more so because it has been revealed (students found this out) that
Wiesengrund [Adorno] (a half-Jew and one of the most repulsive human
beings I know) tried to go along with the Nazis. For years now he and
Horkheimer have accused or threatened to accuse anyone in Germany who
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was against them of being anti-Semitic. A really disgusting bunch. (emp.
added)14
Still, Arendt is forced to admit right afterwards that “Wiesengrund [Adorno] is not
untalented.” Jaspers, in his response, is equally as assailing. He suggests that Adorno’s
attempted cooperation with the Nazis should be more publicly known, but it seems to be
kept quiet because he “is becoming something of an authority in the Federal Republic.”
He continues, “What a fraud. In what I have read of him, I find nothing worthy of
serious consideration.”15 Arendt explains that Adorno did respond with “an indescribably
pathetic letter” that somehow “impressed the Germans a great deal.” She found it
additionally revolting that Adorno, “the only half-Jew among Jews,” did not even tell his
Jewish friends and colleagues of his attempted collaboration.16 The only member of the
School that Arendt actually befriended was Walter Benjamin, himself somewhat of an
outsider, whom she affectionately calls “Benji” in her letters. After Benjamin died trying
to escape from Europe, Arendt fought vigorously (and ultimately successfully) to get his
manuscript Theses on the Philosophy of History published. By chance, she happened to
be the only one with a copy of it. In a letter to Heinrich Blucher, she asks him to help her
get it published because “that group of bastards” (the Frankfurt School) will try to
suppress it.17 She writes, “I’m all alone and horribly desperate and frightened because
they don’t seem willing to print it. And so terribly furious that I could murder that whole
lot of them.”18
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Beyond the personal squabbles with the Frankfurt School, Arendt did indeed have
genuine philosophical criticisms of Critical Theory. It began with the School’s adoption
of the word critique. As we have seen, Arendt exalted Kant’s notion of critique. The
Frankfurt school, however, adopted Marx’s notion of critique. In her Lectures on Kant’s
Political Philosophy Arendt explains that Marx’s Capital was originally called The
Critique of Political Economy, showing his debt to Kant. Marx, however, equated
criticism with praxis, or putting theory into action. He called Kant “the philosopher of
the French Revolution,” because Kant’s theoretical dismantling of the ancien regime had
been followed by the French Revolution’s practical destruction of it.19 Arendt argues
that because Marx rejected philosophy, he came to the conclusion that “reason and
philosophical thinking are good for nothing and that ‘critique’ means destruction, in
thought, of whatever it seizes upon, as against Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ as limitation
and purification”20 Critical Theory for the Frankfurt School was Marx’s notion of
critique, not Kant’s (or Arendt’s). Thus, their critique of the modern world was
ultimately an attempt to destroy it, because as Marxists they still believed in the eventual
proletarian revolution. Even in its critique of Marxism itself, Critical Theory wanted to
supplant Orthodox Marxism, in essence destroying it. Arendt, though borrowing a great
deal from Marx, definitely did not think of herself as a Marxist. She could never align
herself with the Frankfurt School because of their allegiance to Marx, even if it was their
own unique brand of Marxism.
For all the negativity surrounding Arendt and the Frankfurt School it may seem
odd that Dana Villa argues that she is one of the most influential thinkers in the tradition
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of Critical Theory. Villa does not get his argument from the first generation of critical
theorists, as they clearly disliked her as much as she hated them. Instead, it was the
second generation of critical theorists that took a step back and realized the connections
between Arendt and their predecessors. No one did more to integrate Arendt’s ideas into
the tradition of Critical Theory than Jürgen Habermas. He recognized the common
distaste for over-rational and over-individualistic systems of thought in both Arendt and
the Frankfurt School. Habermas, however, wanted to show that rationality did not need
to be completely destructive when thought of in terms of speech, which he called
consensual or dialogical rationality. Such an emphasis on speech drew him to Arendt,
and in his own unique way Habermas combined the Marxian ideas of the Frankfurt
School with Arendt’s notions of speech and action. Dana Villa writes,
Marx’s notion of labor as praxis conflates acting and making, blinding
him to the specificity of the political realm and the peculiar structure of
practical discourse…Critical Theory thus found itself at an impasse, which
it escaped, so the Habermasian story goes, thanks largely to Hannah
Arendt. 21
Arendt’s distinction between acting and making allowed Habermas to distinguish
between communicative and instrumental action. He maintains the Marxian notion of
material determinism in the economic realm, while at the same time conceiving of
politics in terms of communicative action alone.
In developing his own ideas Habermas returned to the Enlightenment era as well.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, European society experienced a fundamental change
to its social structure. Urbanization spread rapidly, improved technology and
transportation allowed for better communication both near and far, and a growing middle
class emerging onto the scene for the first time in European history. Habermas called this
21
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phenomenon “the rise of the public” in his groundbreaking study, Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). Ever since, the concept of “the rise of the
public” has been a cornerstone in eighteenth century historiography. In his Structural
Transformation Habermas describes how the changing social structure allowed for
unprecedented levels of communication, which led to the development of a newly formed
public sphere. Coffeehouses, Masonic lodges, and salons—like Rahel’s—served as
“public” places where opinions could originate, be discussed, and passed onto others.
Habermas’s distinction between private and public spheres echoed Arendt’s own theories
on the structures of the private and public realms in The Human Condition. Seyla
Benhabib even writes, “The very first pages of this work [Structural Transformation]
reveal the centrality of Habermas’s dialogue with Arendt.”22
In 1977, two years after Hannah Arendt’s death, the Journal of Social Research
devoted an entire issue to analyzing the many different aspects of her thought. Habermas
contributed with his article “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power.”23 He
defines the traditional concept of power as “the possibility of forcing one’s own will on
the behavior of the others.” Arendt, on the other hand, he argues, rejects such a definition
because it describes force, not power. Power, for Arendt, is “the ability to agree upon a
common course of action in unconstrained communication.”24 In The Human Condition
Arendt continually asserts that power, and not force, maintains the political realm; all
attempts to replace power with force only end in disaster for politics.25 Habermas argues,
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it is “the mobilization of consent that produces power.” He writes, “Communicative
action is the medium for which the intersubjectively shared life-world is formed.”26
Communicative action, for both Arendt and Habermas, gives birth to and maintains a free
public realm. Drawing from Arendt and the Frankfurt School, Habermas remains
suspicious of the possibilities of modern mass society to curtail free and open speech in
favor of conditioned behavior, but he offers his concept of communicative action as a
possible answer to such dangers.27
Arendt is critical of any philosophy that denies human plurality as the basis for
politics. The rational individualism of the Enlightenment was no different than the
introspection of Romanticism in the fact that both tried to make the individual the
measure of all things while at the same time subverting him to universal laws outside his
control. In Arendt’s mind, virtually every modern philosopher, from Descartes and Kant
to Hegel and Marx, became caught individualistic web of thinking in some way. It came
to define not only modern thought, but also modern society and modern politics as well,
bringing with it unprecedented growth and prosperity but also levels of death and
destruction never before seen in the history of the world. The goal of Arendt’s thinking
is to understand the problems caused by individualistic thinking, and hopefully find an
answer to the devastation that it can foster. Through the work of Habermas and others,
Arendt’s ideas continue to grow and develop in the twenty-first century, giving them new
life with each new thinker.
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VITA
Joshua Luke Yoder was born in Albany, Georgia, on April 4, 1983. His father,
Robert Yoder, was born into an Amish community in Holmes County, Ohio, in 1948.
Although Robert’s parents decided to break with the community, taking their nine
children with them, they continued to live in Holmes County itself and remained close to
their Amish roots. At age 18 Robert left home to join the United States Navy and while
stationed in Memphis, Tennessee, he met Joshua’s mother, Anna Yockman. Anna was
born in 1950 in New York City and raised in the borough of Queens until she met Robert
while visiting a friend. After meeting Robert, the two wed and moved to Ohio for a short
while. Eventually Robert’s work brought him to Georgia, where his four sons, Joshua
being the youngest, were born and raised.
Joshua lived in southern Georgia until the age of five, when work caused his
father to move once again. Joshua moved with his family to the rural town of Armuchee,
a suburb of Rome, in northwest Georgia. There Joshua spent the remainder of his
childhood into his early teen years. He attended Glenwood Elementary, the local county
school, where he spent several years in the gifted program. In the seventh grade his
parents decided to send him to Rome city schools, which could provide a better education
than the county schools. He attended Rome Middle School for two years where once
again he took advanced classes. He was also on both the wrestling and cross county
teams. In fact, he played these two sports every year until graduating from high school.
Joshua then attended Rome High School for one year, but the following summer he
moved with his family to Calhoun, Georgia, roughly thirty minutes north of the city of
Rome.
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In Calhoun, Joshua attended Gordon Central High School where he received his
diploma with highest honors in 2001. After high school, he wanted to teach history at the
high school level himself. As most of his friends chose to enter the military after high
school, he did not feel much social pressure to attend a larger university, like the
University of Georgia. Instead, he chose to enroll in Reinhardt College, a small liberal
arts college in Waleska, Georgia. At Reinhardt, Joshua received the presidential
scholarship all four years, which paid for his tuition and room and board in full. He lived
on campus during the school year, working for the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Department, but came home to Calhoun to work in the summers.
While at Reinhardt Joshua came to the conclusion that he would be much happier
teaching college rather than high school. So, instead of pursuing a degree in education,
he decided to focus solely on history. Joshua also got to know one of the sociology
professors very well, and decided to minor in that field. The combination of sociology,
particularly social theory, and history led Joshua to question the structure of society and
politics in history. Also bonding with a German historian during his time at Reinhardt
led Joshua towards studies in modern Germany. By the time he received in Bachelor of
arts in 2005, it was clear to him that he wanted to study German intellectual history,
though he still had a very basic understanding of what that entailed.
Joshua made the decision to go onto to graduate school when he decided he
wanted to teach college as a career. His senior year at Reinhardt he looked at several
colleges in the Southeastern United States. He found several professors at Louisiana
State University doing research in areas he found interesting, and after being accepted in
the graduate program, he decided to attend the university. At Louisiana State University,
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Joshua increased his overall knowledge of history by vast amounts. When it came time
to choose his thesis topic he remembered a book he read the summer after graduating
from Reinhardt. The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt was assigned in one
of his classes at Reinhardt, but the professor felt it was too complex for the students and
told them they did not have to read it. Joshua, however, having already purchased the
book, held onto it, and decided to read it on his own. Having enjoyed the book and felt
intellectually stimulated, he decided to make Hannah Arendt the focus of his thesis work.
From there he set out learn all he could about Hannah Arendt, and found that in doing so
he had to learn the entire philosophical tradition from Plato to Habermas. Thus, by the
time the thesis was completed he not only had internalized a massive amount of historical
data, but also an entirely new set of ideas in politics and philosophy. With such a mental
investment, Joshua then realized that a career in intellectual history would require a great
deal more learning and understanding. Therefore, he has chosen to take a few years off
in between his master’s and doctorate to further internalize all the new ideas he
encountered in the past several years. Before returning to school he plans to teach
freshman level Western Civilization courses for a few years to both gain teaching
experience and to sharpen his historical knowledge. His commitment to intellectual
history is stronger than ever, but he realizes that it is quite an undertaking, one that will
take many years, possibly even a lifetime, to fully grasp all the nuances of such a
complex field: a lifetime he is most willing to devote.
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